\u3cem\u3eIn re\u3c/em\u3e Radical Interpretations of American Law:  The Relation of Law and History by Nash, A. E. Keir
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 2 
1983 
In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of 
Law and History 
A. E. Keir Nash 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Race Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A. E. K. Nash, In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law and History, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 274 (1983). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/7 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
IN RE RADICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
AMERICAN LAW: THE RELATION OF 
LAW AND IDSTORY 
A.E. Keir Nash* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION •••.•.•••....•.••••.•..••...•.•.••.•.•••..••••• 274 
I. NON-MARxlST RADICAL INTERPRETATION: CONFLICT 
OF LAWS AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY. • • • • • • • 278 
A. Comparing Marxist and Non-Marxist Approaches to 
Analyzing the Law of Slavery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 
B. Finke/man's Instrumentalist ''Breakdown of Comity" 
Thesis ............................................... 282 
C. Assessing Finke/man's Thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 
D. Sampling and the Question of a Collapse of Southern 
Comity - Finke/man's Problematic Generalizations 
and the Evidence .. . . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . .. 296 
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF A "NON-REDUCTIONIST" MARxIST 
GENERAL THEORY OF .AMERICAN LAW •.•••.•..•.••••..•• 314 
A. Non-Marxist Criticisms of Tushnet on the Law of 
Slavery.............................................. 314 
B. Non-Marxist Criticisms of Tushnet on ''Liberal" 
Constitutional Interpretation or: Coming At 
Constitutional .Debating Issues From the Extra-
Paradigmatic North ................................. 317 
C. Maxis/ Language as a Barrier to Understanding, and 
Tushnet's Maximum and Minimum Goals for a Marx-
ist Theory of American Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 
THE ROAD AHEAD . • . • • • • . • • . • • • . . • . • • • • • . • . • • • • • . • . • • • • • • . • • 344 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen the emergence of at least four types of 
analysis of American law that variously challenge conventional legal 
research undertaken within the intellectual boundaries of American 
empirical and normative pragmatism. Two of these types - post-
• Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara. A.B. 1958'; 
Harvard University; M.A. 1961, University of North Carolina; Ph.D. 1968, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1968. - Ed. 
I wish to thank Martin Shapiro for critiquing an earlier draft of this article and making 
valuable suggestiollS-50me of which I followed. 
274 
November 1983) Radical Interpretations 275 
positivist legal philosophy1 and Posnerian neo-positivist economic-
legal analysis2 - have been much debated elsewhere3 and are only 
peripherally touched upon in this Article. Neither is primarily con-
cerned with assessing the historical relationships among American 
law, polity, and economy for any reason, whether to understand a 
historical problem in itself, to develop a historically grounded theory 
of the American legal experience, or to ascertain the limits, if any, 
that history places upon the law's role in the solution of contempo-
rary American problems. 
This Article centers instead upon assessing two types of legal 
analysis - non-Marxist radical interpretation and "non-reduction-
ist" Marxist theory - which, despite conspicuous differences, share 
the belief that understanding the American historical experience is a 
prerequisite to understanding American law. Both approaches also 
share two other important convictions. One is that a "consensual" or 
"liberal pluralist"4 version of American history has little explanatory 
l. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); R. DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); J. 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For a useful overview and critique of Rawls, Nozick, 
and utilitarian philosophy, see P. PETTIT, JUDGING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEM-
PORARY PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY (1980). 
2. See R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Posner, Some Uses and 
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. R.E.v. 281 (1979); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, 
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). 
3. See, e.g., READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A Theory of Justice (N. Dan-
iels ed. 1975); Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic 
Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. R.E.v. 221 (1980); A Spectrum of Responses to John Raw/s's 
Theory, 69 AM. PoL. Ser. R.E.v. 588 (1975) (articles by Chapman, Harsanyi, Van Dyke, 
Fishkin, Rae, Bloom and Barber); Jurisprudence Symposium, 11 GA. L. R.E.v. 969 (1972) (dis-
cussing Dworkin); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. R.E.v. 485 (1980) 
(on economics and law); Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980). 
4. "Consensual" is the term many American historians favor, while "liberal pluralist" is 
the one that political scientists typically use. Each term amounts to much the same view of 
American history and contemporary politics, emphasizing the broad measure of agreement on 
Lockean liberal political philosophy and the consequent generally low level of conflict per-
ceived to characterize the course of United States history. In 1955, Professor Louis Hartz 
wrote a brilliant book, The Liberal Tradition in America, arguing that America 
was the prisoner of a bourgeois frame of political reference that had forestalled the devel-
opment of either a strong radical or a strong conservative political tradition • . • • The 
only political theorist for Americans, Hartz insisted, was the quintessential bourgeois En-
glishman, John Locke. • • • Hartz's book captured the imagination of a generation of 
students of American culture." 
Howe, European Sources of Political Ideas in Jeffersonian America, 10 RE.VIEWS IN AM. HIST. 
28, 28 (1982). For some examinations of new American historiographical trends that question 
Hartz's consensual interpretation, see Bartley, In Search of the New South: Southern Politics 
After Reconstruction, 10 R.E.VIEws IN AM. HIST. ISO (1982); Chudacoff, Success and Security: 
The Meaning of Social Mobility in America, 10 R.E.vrnws IN AM. HIST. 101 (1982); Foner, 
Reconstruction Revisited, 10 RE.VIEWS IN AM. HIST. 82 (1982); Hollinger, American Intellectual 
History: Issues for the 1980s, 10 RE.VIEWS IN AM. HIST. 306 (1982); Rodgers, In Search of 
Progressivism, 10 RE.VIEWS IN AM. HIST. 113 (1982); Wilentz, On Class and Politics in Jackso-
nian America, 10 RE.VIEWS IN AM. HIST. 45 (1982). 
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validity, at least in regard to such major problems as the political 
and legal breakdown represented by the Civil War, and the law's 
role in American economic development. They also agree that his-
torical explanations which downplay discussion of economic forces 
in the law's evolution are explanations which downplay truth. These 
common convictions cause me to group these two approaches, de-
spite their deep-seated differences, as "radical interpretations of 
American law." 
One of these radical interpretations is explicitly Marxist. The 
other is not. This observation suggests perhaps the most important 
of three major differences. That difference has to do with the extent 
to which American law has merely reflected the economic and polit-
ical interests of dominant groups or classes versus the extent to 
which American law has had a separate life of its own, evolving au-
tonomously from the larger polity or economy. Surprisingly, at least 
for those whose understanding of Marxism was formed before the 
1970s, the current sophisticated Marxist view is the less determinist 
of the two radical interpretations. Indeed, this type of Marxist view 
strongly criticizes non-Marxist radical interpretations for engaging in 
"instrumental reductionism" - for adopting a view of American le-
gal history that reduces American law to a mere instrument of domi-
nant classes. 
The second difference flows from the first. It is that contempo-
rary American Marxist analysis displays fairly intense concern for 
working out knotty aspects of the problem of the law's autonomy, 
while contemporary non-Marxist radical analysis does not. In this 
sense, non-Marxist radical analysis is simultaneously closer to, and 
further from, more conventional liberal-individualist and American 
conservative interpretations of law in society. On the one hand, its 
almost "populist" simplicity as to who gets what and who doesn't, 
and its tendencies to quasi-melodrama about who controls the law 
and who doesn't, make it seem very much in the American tradition. 
On the other hand, the result of that quasi-melodramatic approach 
-yielding less autonomy to the law - places it analytically further 
away from formalist legal approaches than is current American 
Marxist analysis. 
The third major difference pertains to scope. Non-Marxist anal-
ysis, uninterested in - or, if you prefer, unencumbered by - the 
task of working out a general theory of American law, tends to be 
much more compartmentalized in its analysis on two chief counts. 
First, it compartmentalizes quite unself-consciously within history, 
both as to time and geography as well_as to legal subject. Thus, it is 
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not fazed by the compartmentalization entailed in writing about the 
transformation of American law using nineteenth century industrial-
ization as the explanation and Northeastern United States private 
law as the dominant data base - while largely ignoring relation-
ships among Northeastern and Southern or Middle Western econo-
mies and relationships between constitutional and private law.5 
Similarly, in analyzing the law's role in the quarrel over slavery, 
non-Marxist radical analysis separates problems of comity-and-slav-
ery from relationships with the criminal administration of justice in 
a slave society or from relationships with issues of economic growth 
and competing economic forms.6 In marked contrast, Marxist analy-
sis, which aims at a general theory of American law in its more am-
bitious moments, is both considerably more holistic and 
considerably more troubled by the way in which different "parts of 
history" fit together. The second major count on which Marxist the-
ory is less compartmentalized pertains to time past and time present. 
Marxist analysis has much more to say about contemporary 
problems in American law and polity and their linkages to the past. 
These differences and similarities account for the structure of this 
Article. Part I undertakes, after briefly comparing Marxist and non-
Marxist radical approaches to analyzing the law of American slav-
ery, to assess Paul Finkelman'sAn Imperfect Union,7 the most recent 
substantial non-Marxist radical essay on the subject. This task is un-
dertaken first because it is, from a nonradical perspective, more 
straightforward. 
Part II lays the ground for understanding and evaluating Marxist 
analysis of American law. It focuses primarily on the work of Mark 
5. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); see 
also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). For a good defense of this ap-
proach, see L. Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Remarks on Southern Legal 
History (unpublished paper delivered at the Second Conference on Southern Legal History, 
Gulfport, Mississippi, Feb. 1983). In regard to the tendency of books on 19th American law to 
downplay or omit Southern legal history, Friedman observes: 
Why are these Southern instances ignored? Simply because, from the standpoint of the 
North, including Northern courts, they were regional ... not mainstream .... [l]n the 
nineteenth-century, there was a commonly accepted core of the legal system; and it was 
certainly not in the South . . . . [T]oday . . . the core has been redefined. California is 
the most frequently cited state-court today .... This has to be recognized. Keir Nash, in 
a rather nasty passage in . . . "Reason of Slavery'' which appeared in . . . the Vanderbilt 
Law Review, in 1979 . . . accused me of appalling sloppiness and ignorance on this sub-
ject .... 
Id at 6-7. It war a nasty passage. The devil made me do it. 
For a favorable commentary on Horwitz's book, see Nash, Book Review, 73 AM. POL. Sci. 
REV. 244 (1979). 
6. See P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 
(1981). 
1. Id 
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Tushnet, the Marxist scholar whose work to date most amply covers 
issues in both contemporary American law and American legal his-
tory even as it exemplifies and enunciates some of the problems in-
herent in working out an adequate Marxist theory of American law. 
Part II lays this ground in three steps. First, it briefly examines the 
reactions of non-Marxist legal historians to Tushnet's principal his-
torical work, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860.8 Second, it 
examines in parallel fashion non-Marxist reactions in the area of 
Tushnet's other major concentration, current issues in constitutional 
law. Both sets of reactions indicate a "threshold problem" that 
Marxist legal scholars face: getting their arguments read accurately 
and taken seriously. Thus, the third step consists of removing some 
of the barriers to understanding by "defanging" Marxist language 
that appears particularly troublesome to non-Marxists, and by 
describing what contemporary Marxist scholars such as Tushnet take 
to be appropriate goals for Marxist analysis of American law. 
An additional aspect of this analysis, to be explored in a later 
article, will undertake to evaluate Marxist work in the areas of cur-
rent constitutional law and the legal history of slavery, focusing 
again primarily but not exclusively on ''Tushnetian Marxism." That 
analysis will develqp two main themes. The first is whether and to 
what extent Tushnetian criticism of contemporary legal scholarship 
flows from an internally coherent Marxist theory, or from a less co-
herent series of Marxist insights, or from something much less "for-
eign" - to wit, "Neo-Legal-Realism" run rampant. The second 
main theme is the adequacy and promise of such criticism, regard-
less of its intellectual origin, as it pertains to four areas of intense 
current controversy: slavery's legal history, the defensibility of con-
stitutional structural review, the question of interpretivist versus 
noninterpretivist constitutional construction, and the viability of 
"democratic-process-protecting" judicial review versus "substantive-
due-process review revived." 
I. NoN-MARxlST RADICAL INTERPRETATION: CONFLICT OF 
LAWS AND THE· LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY 
A. Comparing Marxist and Non-Marxist Approaches to Analyzing 
the Law of Slavery 
Finkelman's An Impeifect Union and Tushnet's The American 
Law of Slavery, 1810-1860, together with Eugene Genovese's lengthy 
review essay, Slavery in the Legal History of the South and the Na-
8. M. TUSHNET, THE.AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981). 
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tion ,9 suggest the rough contours of a radical interpretation of the 
relations between law and society in the era of American slavery.10 
These analyses also suggest some major obstacles to a comprehen-
sive radical interpretation of the development of American law. Al-
though I shall at times criticize the manner in which Tushnet and 
Finkelman marshal and assess evidence, even where I disagree on 
the specifics I am fairly sympathetic to their main purposes, more so, 
I expect, than a number of other commentators.11 To the extent that 
Finkelman attempts to relate the judiciary and slave law to the com-
ing of the Civil War and to the extent that Tushnet tries to provide 
both a "Restatement" of the law of slavery12 and an account ofrela-
9. Genovese, Slavery in the Legal History of the South and the Nation (Book Review), 59 
TEX. L. REv. 969 (1981). A version of Genovese's essay that has been expanded to include 
analysis of Morton Horwitz's writings has just appeared in L. Fox-GENOVESE & E. GENO-
VESE, FRUITS OF MERCHANT CAPITAL: SLAVERY AND BOURGEOIS PROPERTY IN THE RISE 
AND EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM 337 (1983). 
10. Although I say here "a radical interpretation," Finkelman's approach, see Part I-A 
i'!fra, differs significantly from those ofTushnet and Genovese, which are much more explic-
itly Marxist. Finkelman's radicalism is almost as chaste of leftist "deep structure" as the 
McGovernite 1972 Democratic Party National Platform. Tushnet, by contrast, is striving for 
systematic critical analysis, even if his results often appear no more threatening to American 
capitalism and its legal-historical superstructures than the Faculty Club luncheon menu at the 
University of Belgrad. 
11. Finkelman's book has come off quite well, though it has taken occasional knocks. See 
Ely, Book Review, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1755 (1981); Jackson, Book Review, 66 J. NEGRO HIST. 
329 (1981) (a much less analytical review); see also Reid, Lessons of Lumpkin: A Review of 
Recent Literature on Law, Comity, and the Impending Crisis, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571 
(1982). Reid is good reading but not, on this subject, well-read. Lessons of Lumpkin proceeds 
on the basis of two mistakes. Mistake One is assuming that the most vocal case is also indica-
tive of Southern judicial attitudes in general. "Of these [Deep South] states, none should be 
more revealing than Georgia." Id. at 578. Why should it be? Prior research suggests the 
contrary. That indicates Mistake Two - giving us as if novel and probably representative 
what is at least a thrice-told tale of uniquely ardent pro-slavery rhetoric in the antebellum 
Georgia Supreme Court under Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin. See Nash, The Texas Supreme 
Court and Trial Rights of Blacks 1845-1860, 58 J. AM. HIST. 622, 624 n.11 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as Nash, Trial Rights of Blacks] (''The Georgia supreme court, from its creation in 1845, 
had the solitary distinction of being the only continuously pro-slavery, 'fire-eating' state 
supreme court."); see also Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Pecu-
liar Institution, 32 V AND. L. REv. 7, 104-23 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Nash, Reason of Slav-
ery]; Stephenson & Stephenson, "To Protect and .Defend·" Joseph Henry Lumpkin, The 
Supreme Court of Georgia, and Slavery, 25 EMORY L.J. 579 (1976). Generally, Reid's essay 
takes analysis of the law of slavery backward rather than forward. For forward progress, see 
Morris, ''As !(the Injury was Effected by the Natural Elements of Air, or Fire':· Slave Wrongs and 
the Liability of Masters, 16 LAW & SoCY. REv. 569 (1981-1982). 
Tushnet's book has taken harder knocks. Except for Genovese's extended paean, see 
Genovese, supra note 9, at 998, the more substantial reviews have ranged from somewhat to 
very critical. See, e.g., Finkelman, The Peculiar Laws of the Peculiar Institution (Book Re-
view), 10 REVIEWS IN AM. HIST. 358 (1982); Watson, Slave Law: History and Ideology (Book 
Review), 91 YALE L.J. 1034 (1982). But see Wiecek, Book Review, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 274 (mixed review). For generally favorable shorter reviews, see Hall, Book Re-
view, 87 AM. HIST. REv. 855 (1982); Hyman, Book Review, 69 J. AM. HIST. 158 (1982). 
12. See M. TusHNET, supra note 8, at 9. 
280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:274 
tionships among the law, ideology and economy of slavery, each is 
pursuing worthwhile objectives. 
It is important to understand at the outset the major differences 
in the purposes and methods of Finkelman and Tushnet. Unlike 
Tushnet's book, which explicitly doubts the utility of legal decisions 
in illuminating attitudinal currents in political history, 13 Finkelman's 
An Impe,fect Union is legal history solidly anchored in political and 
social history. Where Tushnet's core aim is "to pry apart the cases to 
disclose the ordering implicit in slave law,"14 Finkelman is as inter-
ested in using the materials of legal history to explain the impending 
Civil War as he is in using political events to clarify the development 
of the law of slavery. Where Tushnet's version of Marxist analysis15 
rejects "[c]riteria of justice and fairness ... [as] far too simple ... 
ordering principles,"16 Finkelman frequently evaluates develop-
ments in those terms. Thus, for example, he evaluates state supreme 
courts in terms of their "fidelity to law'' and "impartiality of decision 
making."17 In marked contrast, Tushnet's primary search is for a 
structure of rules evolving toward autonomy from Northern and 
British nineteenth century law and toward semi-autonomy from the 
economic substructure of slavery.18 It is almost as if Tushnet's per-
fect analytic product would be an a-chronological distillate from his-
13. See id. at 11-27. Note, however, that Tushnet does not reject judicial opinions as "a 
useful source of insight into the ideological structures from which slavery drew support." Id. 
at 11. 
14. Id. at 25. 
15. I say ''Tushnet's version" advisedly because scholars differ as to whether Marx himself 
thought, and whether modem Marxists should think, it analytically meaningful to assess capi-
talist and other pre-revolutionary legal structures in terms of moral categories, such as justice, 
injustice, fairness, unfairness, and the like, that transcend the then-prevailing mode of produc-
tion. Compare Wood, The Marxian Critique of Justice, in MARX, JUSTICE, AND HISTORY 3 (M, 
Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1980) (Marx does not condemn capitalism as unjust), with 
Husami, Marx on JJistrihutive Justice, in MARX, JUSTICE, AND HISTORY, supra, at 42 (Marx 
does condemn capitalism as unjust). 
16. M. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 25. 
17. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 182. 
18. Exactly what Tushnet means by autonomy of the law of slavery has given non-Marxist 
analysts trouble. See, e.g., Wiecek, supra note 11, at 277: 
Tushnet posits that the law, as a social artifact, exercises a "relative autonomy" in any 
society, a position that I find odd from one operating within a Marxian framework. 
Tushnet maintains this position as a more acceptable alternative to a view that he ascribes 
to Elkins and others who saw law as nothing more than a reflex of economic or social 
relationships in society. But where, in Marxian terms, the superstructure of a society is 
determined by the relations of production, it is difficult to see law as being anything but a 
reflection of the interests of the hegemonic classes. 
The source of some of the difficulties may be indicated by Finkelman's remark that "to be 
blunt, this is one of the most poorly written books I have ever reviewed." Finkelman, supra 
note 11, at 358. That seems a bit harsh. At least some of the complexity is in the eye of the 
non-Marxist beholder ex necessitate. For discussion of a similar misreading of Tushnet by 
Nash, see L. Fox-GENOVESE & E. GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 372. 
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tory - as if he wished to map a timeless, perfected form of slave law 
upon the historiographical equivalent of Keats' Grecian um, to 
transfix it there, forever changeless and beyond all human passion.19 
In marked contrast, Finkelman takes us through an analysis whose 
temporal progressions are far more familiar to the pragmatic Ameri-
can historical sensibility. 
This, however, does not mean that Finkelman is right and 
Tushnet wrong. At a minimum, we should consider the potential 
relevance of Fredric Jameson's comment that the empiricism of the 
Anglo-American analytic tradition, though intimately tied to philo-
sophic liberalism, is profoundly conservative in its political conse-
quences. Thus: 
[T]he bankruptcy of the liberal tradition . . . does not mean that it has 
lost its prestige or ideological potency. On the contrary: the anti-specu-
lative bias of that tradition, its emphasis on the individual fact or item 
at the expense of the network of relationships in which that item may 
be embedded, continue to encourage submission to what is by prevent-
ing its followers from making connections, and in particular from 
drawing the otherwise unavoidable conclusions on the political level. 
It is therefore time for those of us in the sphere of influence of the 
Anglo-American tradition to learn to think dialectically, to acquire the 
rudiments of a dialectical culture and the essential critical weapons 
which it provides.20 
Although this Article is hardly the place to venture a complete dia-
lectic education, we should note the difficulties that the dialectic 
writer's basic formal problem imposes for understanding legal 
history: · 
He who has so intense a feeling for the massive continuity of his-
tory itself is somehow paralyzed by that very awareness. . . . Where 
all the dimensions of history cohere in synchronic fashion, the simple 
linear stories of. . . historians are no longer possible: now it is diach-
rony and continuity which become problematical .... 21 
That problem is substantial. Equally troubling is the second-order 
problem produced by the critical reflexes of Anglo-American tradi-
tional minds reacting to essays venturing a dialectic interpretation of 
legal history. These problems are not restricted to the dialectical his-
torian alone - at least if those of us who are not Marxists ( or Hege-
lians) wish to avoid ruling out ab initio a possible truth or two. We 
19. See J. KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Um, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN KEATS 295-97 
(H. Forman ed. 1908). My point in making this reference is to single out this characteristic in 
Tushnet's intellectual modeling because it has vexed others as if it arose regardless of, rather 
than in substantial measure due to, the Marxist analysis. 
20. F. JAMESON, MARxlsM AND FORM: TwENTIETH CENTURY DIALECTICAL THEORIES OF 
LITERATURE at x-xi (1971). 
21. Id. at 50-51. 
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make, after all, two assumptions about the relationships among 
form, knowledge, and truth that the dialectian does not. One is that 
truth of a historical sort is best captured in a narrative essay. In con-
trast, the dialectician's "larger form will . . . be a construct rather 
than a narrative."22 Our other assumption is that, though truth is 
captured in the narrative form, the capturing is best done via facts 
that are both separable from the language used to narrate them and 
selected and arranged in objectified, if not objective, structures by a 
narrating subject (an author) whose subjectivity and subjective rela-
tions with the objectified facts are ( on behalf of both good form and 
maximized knowledge) kept well suppressed. For us, good taste, fac-
tual thickness, and subjective detachment go hand in hand. They 
yield sufficient insight if not systematic explanation. But is that nec-
essarily so? 
B. Finke/man's Instrumentalist "Breakdown of Comity" Thesis 
Finkelman's central argument is that decision making in the an-
tebellum state court systems, both North and South, roughly paral-
leled the development of broader political opinion about slavery and 
the Federal Union. Specifically, he contends that the willingness of 
Northern judiciaries to honor, out of comity, laws and decisions of 
Southern states - and vice versa - moved through three phases. In 
the first phase, extending from the ratification of the Constitution to 
roughly 1830, slave states and free states "tried to accommodate each 
other in a spirit of comity and national unity'' despite their "compet-
ing interests and ideologies."23 During this phase, Southern courts 
generally "recognized and accepted the acts and judicial decisions of 
free states that emancipated visiting slaves."24 Although most 
Northern states by the 1820s had moved gradually from slavery to-
ward freedom (though hardly equality) for all blacks,25 and although 
some Northern states limited the time that Southern slaveholders 
could spend visiting in the North with their slaves,26 ''the free states 
tried to accommodate their slaveholding neighbors who traveled or 
22. Id. at 51. 
23. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 46. 
24. Id. at 11. 
25. In retrospect, one sometimes underestimates how early the Northern states freed their 
slaves. Vermont's 1777 constitution abolished slavery. See VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. I. New 
Jersey, under its gradual emancipation statutes, still had a few slaves in 1860. See State v. 
Post, 21 NJ.L. 699 (1848); N.J. REv. STAT. tit. xi, ch. 6, § l (1846). 
26. For example, in the 1780s Pennsylvania established a six-month limitation, while New 
York provided for a nine-month limitation in 1817. See 1780 Pa. Laws ch. 68, § 10; P. 
FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 46 n.l. 
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sojourned in the North."21 
During the second phase, which stretched from the 1830s into the 
1850s,28 accommodation gave way to confrontation. This second 
phase displayed at least three characteristics. The first pertained to 
the types of comity issues that produced litigation in Northern 
courts. In general, four broad situations, other than unlawful flight29 
or manumittory intent on the part of the master,30 could explain a 
slave's presence in a Northern jurisdiction and provide grounds for 
arguing that the master should be divested of his human property. 
These were, in diminishing order of duration in a free state or terri-
tory: (I) in-migrant residency or domicile; (2) sojourn (nonperma-
nent presence longer than a visit); (3) visit; and (4) transit. Pre-1830 
court cases almost always involved longer-duration issues - for ex-
ample, when it was reasonable for a court to conclude that an in-
migrating master had forfeited his human property by falling short 
of Pennsylanvia's statutory registration-of-blacks requirements.31 A 
signal feature of litigation in Northern courts of the 1830s, 1840s and 
1850s was the shift towards litigating claims of freedom based on 
27. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
28. Finkleman's thesis is ambiguous as to the precise dates of the beginning and ending of 
the breakdown of comity and as to whether the dates are those of the general political break-
down between the sections or those of judicial decisions. He sometimes seems to perceive the 
second phase as beginning and/or ending earlier than he does at other times. At one point, for 
example, he observes that "[o]ne critical but long-overlooked aspect of the federal Union was 
the system of interstate comity that began to break down as early as the 1820s and was well on 
the road to self-destruction by the 1840s." Id at 11-12. Finkelman later states: 
By 1832 slavery had become a major political issue in the nation. The Missouri crisis 
of 1820 •.. [and] Nat Turner's rebellion ••• focused national attention on slavery. Yet 
throughout all of this the state courts of the North maintained their desire for interstate 
comity and harmony. Only in Pennsylvania was any real attempt made to interfere with 
the movement of slaves. • . • But in the decade of the 1830s this pattern began to change. 
Starting in Massachusetts • . • [t]he legal harmony of the nation's first five decades was 
about to end. 
Id at 99-100. For a useful discussion of Northern judicial and legislative attitudes and slavery 
rulings, see T. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-
1861 (1974) (focusing not on comity and interstate ''voluntary'' travel but on attempts to pro-
tect blacks from being kidnapped and returned to the South as fugitive slaves). Morris' work 
accords more closely with the earlier dating than with the later. 
In part the ambiguity in dating is inherent in Finkelman's subject matter. But it is greater 
than it need be because of his text's blurred quality on a critical point - the extent to which 
judicial decisions merely reflected general political events versus the extent to which the deci-
sions constituted or contributed to those events. His "legal-historical instrumentalism" is, on 
this point, "soft." 
29. Unlawful flight triggered the provisions of the Constitution's fugitive slave clause and 
the pursuant Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850. These are not matters of novel exploration 
in Finkelman's essay. For such, see s. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 (1970); T. MORRIS, supra note 28. 
30. There is as yet no published, analytically-satisfactory, exhaustive account of manumis-
sion cases "at" the South or "at" the North. But see A. Nash, Negro Rights and Judicial 
Behavior in the Old South 1-376 (1968) {unpublished dissertation, Harvard University). 
31. See 1780 Pa. Laws ch. 68, § 5; P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 101-80. 
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much shorter periods of presence in the North - for example, those 
arising from master-with-accompanying-slave visits or transits. 
The second characteristic was a parallel shift in the options that 
courts exercised in resolving conflict of laws issues.32 The first op-
tion was to "grant comity to all visitors, based on a desire to main-
tain interstate harmony and friendship, even at the expense of local 
laws and institutions."33 The second was to "balance free-state inter-
ests against slave-state interests."34 Option three ''was the enforce-
ment of the lex loci (law of the state of residence) of the slaves 
involved."35 The final option was to "ignore all issues of local policy 
or conflict oflaws theory, by deferring to the United States Constitu-
tion."36 The second phase saw the disappearance of any impulses 
toward exercising the first option, a diminution of even-handed bal-
ancing, and acceptance of the third option in most states. 
A third characteristic of the second phase pertained to shifts in 
substantive doctrines. The first phase had seen occasional confusion 
as to applicable law and, the rest of the time,judicial rejection of the 
Somerset doctrine, which held that a slave could not be returned to 
slavery against his will if a master voluntarily brought him to Eng-
land. 37 The second phase saw, first in Massachusetts38 and later in 
most other Northern states, the acceptance of Somerset-like doctrine 
and rejection of the master's right even to mere speedy transit with 
his slave across a free state. That same phase also saw, according to 
Finkelman, a converse Southern judicial movement away from ear-
32. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 14--15. Note that the four options are Finkelman's 
array. His is not the only way to read the choices available or the propriety of various selec-
tions. See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-145 (3d ed. 
1981). 
33. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 14. 
34. Id at 15. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 15. This is hardly a parallel to the second and third options. Constitutional 
deference describes a necessary juridical effort, not an insulatable option. Few judges thought 
they could put local interests above the Constitution. Rather, their differences involved what 
the Constitution required on this score. 
31. See Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772). Antebellum America generally 
thought Lord Mansfield to have held that a master's voluntary bringing of a slave from the 
West Indies to England freed the slave. Although the actual scope of Mansfield's opinion has 
been questioned in recent years, that dispute pertains more to the actual English holding than 
to the way Americans interpreted it. See generally w. WIECEK, SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY 
CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977); Nadelhaft, The Somersett Case and Slav-
ery: Myth, Reality, and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 193 (1966); Wiecek, Somerset: Lord 
Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 
(1974). 
38. See Co=onwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) (a slave girl brought volun-
tarily from New Orleans to Massachusetts by her mistress could not be removed to the South 
again unless she were willing to go). 
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lier tendencies that had led to a "surprising number of slaves [being] 
. . . freed by courts in slave states, especially in the period before 
1840."39 
The third phase, which arrived on the eve of the Civil War, was 
marked generally by a collapse of comity. According to Finkelman: 
In the South freedom suits based on previous free-state residence were, 
with a few exceptions, virtually impossible to win. Only in Kentucky 
were blacks still able to vindicate such claims with any degree of con-
sistency. Free blacks were barred from most states in the South, and 
emancipation was unlawful in many. The rights of free blacks from 
the North were totally ignored by a number of Southern States.40 
Finkelman concludes that "[w]e must reject the contention that most 
of the South continued to recognize the freedom of slaves who were 
domiciled in the North."41 Rather, "[w]ell before the secession crisis 
of 1860-61, the comity provisions of the Constitution were usually 
ignored when state courts decided cases involving slavery and the 
rights of free blacks."42 Indeed, 
[t]he decisions and statutes of northern and southern states indicate 
that, in some ways, a division of the Union took place before the seces-
sion winter of 1860-61. The legal institutions of the free states reflected 
an antislavery attitude as strong as, and sometimes stronger than, that 
attitude among the general populace. . . . In the South extreme pro-
slavery advocates were leaders of the bar and bench. Southern courts 
were willing to give total protection . . . at the expense of free-state 
laws, the rights of free-state citizens, and interstate comity.43 
Thus, even before Lincoln's election a 'judicial secession had taken 
place"44 and ''the firing on Fort Sumter was only a military manifes-
tation of a judicial and legislative war that had been going on for 
some time between the States."45 The import of Finkelman's argu-
ment is that contemporaries perceived the Civil War and Northern 
victory as rendering impossible a counterfactual future, a phase four 
in which the Taney Court, dominated by a pro-slave majority, could 
have extended some of the implications of the ])red Scott decision to 
"nationalizing slavery."46 
Professor Finkelman tells us a good story with considerable art-
39. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 181. 
40. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 285. The reader could correctly observe that "a 
number" could be anything from one to fifteen in the instant case. 
41. Id. at 184. 
42. Id. at 11. 
43. Id. at 285. 
44. Id. at 183. 
45. Id. at 11. 
46. Id. at 325. 
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fulness.47 At times I found myself close to believing that An Imper-
fect Union is not only good narrative but also entirely true, at least 
until Finkelman begins his hypothetical account of what the Taney 
Court might have done during the 1860s in the absence of the Civil 
War.48 But the suspicious reader may detect in the previous 
passages a reason for second thoughts. Finkelman tells us that the 
firing on Fort Sumter was "only a military manifestation" of a judi-
cial and legislative war. I should have thought that whatever one 
might say about the rude shots that arched across Charleston Harbor 
on April 12 and 13, 1861, one would not say that they were only that. 
I single out these words because they point up an important charac-
teristic of Finkelman's analytic style: overstating or not quite accu-
rately stating something.49 
C. Assessing Finke/man's Thesis 
I shall offer an alternate reading of Finkelman's data and urge 
47. Finkelman's analysis often displays sensitivity to points that have escaped other schol-
ars. Four such instances occur to me. One is that he notes important cases omitted from H. 
CATIERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (1937), for 
example, State v. Laselle, I Blaclcf. 60 (Ind. 1820) (slavery prohibited in Indiana). See P. 
FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 93. Second, Finkelman carefully disentangles inaccurate federal 
reports of Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497), reargued sub 
nom. Oliver v. Weakley, 18 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 10,502) (involving enforce-
ment of the federal Fugitive Slave Laws). See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 252 n.42. In a 
third instance, he highlights a little known but significant fact about the Articles of Confedera-
tion debates. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation guaranteed the "free inhabitants" of 
each state "all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States." THE ARTICLES 
OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. IV. During the debates over adoption of the 
Articles, South Carolina had moved to insert the word ''white" between "free" and "inhabit-
ants." P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 31 n.36 (citing D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUC· 
TURE OF AMERICAN PoLmcs, 1765-1820, at 153-54 (1971)). Finkelman suggests that if haste 
was indeed the reason that the word ''white" was omitted, ''then South Carolina and other 
Deep South states may have felt no obligation, under the Articles or the Constitution, to grant 
comity to free blacks from other states." Id. Whether sound or not, the suggestion is interest-
ing. Fourth, Finkelman points to the ambiguous wording of the privileges and immunities 
clause of article IV of the 1787 Constitution, and to the unsettled questions the ambiguity 
provoked. For example, could a Massachusetts black, venturing into a slave state, demand the 
right to testify that he would have enjoyed in his home state? Or could a slaveowner, visiting 
the North and finding himself embroiled in a legal controversy, demand that the testimony of 
his own slave be excluded? Id. at 33-34. That suggestion is, of course, more striking than 
historically sound. 
48. Although I agree with much of James Ely's critique of Finkelman on this score, see 
Ely, supra note 11, at 1759-63, I think Finkelman is to be co=ended for squarely facing a 
circumstance that, though suppressed from historical narrative at least since the era of 
Rankean scientific history, is nonetheless present Any judgment as to historical responsibility 
implies a counterfactual possibility. Finkelman's effort at being explicit about the matter is 
laudable. 
49. To use the currently popular "deconstructionist" jargon, An Imperfect Union is a 
"strong reading" of the slavery cases it reads. (See H. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VES-
SELS (1982), for an example of the deconstructionist jargon.) The question is whether An Im-
perfect Union is also a "headstrong misreading." 
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that such a reading is at least as plausible as his. Before addressing 
the question of Southern comity that lies at the heart of Finkel.man's 
narrative, I will suggest that his reading contains certain characteris-
tics that undermine major components of his interpretation and that 
intimate the wisdom of a less catastrophic reading of the course of 
antebellum judicial relations between North and South. 
The first of these characteristics is Finkel.man's tendency to over-
look, in certain cases, critical details that would undercut the inter-
pretation that Finkelman offers. This is perhaps a manifestation of 
Finkel.man's general inclination to use a case to support some gener-
alization that he wishes to establish, even when the best reading of 
the case does not offer such support. Combined with his geographi-
cal selectivity in sampling cases, so these failings cast doubt on some 
of the major generalizations that Finkelman defends. More broadly, 
Finkelman gives insufficient consideration to the question oflaw as a 
dependent variable versus law as an internally evolving entity. He 
sometimes classifies decisions dichotomously on the basis of insuffi-
ciently documented assertions about judicial aims - for example, 
and somewhat simplistically, as responding to the conflict of laws 
issues raised by slavery either with "automatic comity'' or with judi-
cial ''war-making." In evaluating decisions, Finkelman tends to 
erect antinomies, that is, "good law'' versus ''bad law'', or even, 
"non-law." In the next subsection I will attempt to detail some of 
these tendencies.s1 Although these failings by no means eliminate 
my respect for Finkel.man's intellectual effort, their presence affects 
the convincingness of some of its chief generalizations. 
I. Interpretation of Vermont and New Jersey Cases 
Finkelman must first establish that harmony prevailed in phase 
one. I do not totally disagree with him on this score. But I confess to 
being disconcerted at his treatment of some of the case evidence on 
the way to establishing his contention. Let us consider his treatment, 
first, of Selectmen of Windsor v. Jacob,s2 the single early nineteenth 
century Vermont case that he :finds relevant to comity, and, second, 
50. See Part 1-D infra. 
5 I. Full discussion of all of these characteristics is not feasible within the confines of this 
essay. Particularly note that I do not here challenge in any detail an arguable assumption at 
the base of Finkelman's comity argument the notion that the only "correct" solutions to the 
conflict oflaws problems involved had to weigh heavily the policy interests expressed in the lex 
loci. Modem conflict of laws analysis might well cavil at the assumption. See generally R. 
CRAMToN, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 32, at 201-309 (1981). 
52. 2 Tyl. 192 (Vt. 1802). 
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of State v. Quick,53 an 1807 New Jersey case that Finkelman thinks 
"indicates a certain bias"54 in the New Jersey court for not granting 
comity when it could well have been granted. Finkelman has this to 
say about the Vermont case: 
The . . . case . . . indicates the attitude of the Vermont Supreme 
Court toward slavery and comity. In 1802 the Board of Selectmen of 
the Town of Windsor sued Stephen Jacob for the maintenance of an 
"infirm, sick, and blind" black woman, whom Jacob allegedly 
purchased as a slave in 1793 and later abandoned. All parties in the 
case agreed slavery could not legally exist in Vermont. But counsel for 
Windsor claimed that a de facto slavery existed before Jacob aban-
doned the woman and thus he was responsible for her care. The state 
supreme court had to decide if the bill of sale from the 1793 purchase 
was admissible as evidence against Jacob. Without the bill ... the 
case . . . would dissolve. 
Judge Royal [sic] Tyler ruled that the bill of sale was not valid in 
Vermont, because the state's constitution was 'express' and 'no inhabit-
ant' could 'hold a slave' in the state. Thus Jacob was not liable for the 
upkeep of the old woman. [Slaves entering Vermont became free un-
less they were fugitives.] Tyler asserted that the "good people of Ver-
mont" would submit ''with cheerfulness" to the enforcement of the 
Fugid.ve Slave Law, even though they might wish that the federal re-
quirements were "more congenial to our modes of thinking." In the 
spirit of comity and nationalism that pervaded this period, Judge Tyler 
declared that Vermonters were "sensible . . . of numerous right bless-
ings to us as individuals, and to the State as an integral of the 
Union."55 
I have quoted at some length because I want the reader first to form 
in her or his mind a clear image of what (going by Finkelman's 
description) she or he thinks the case is about, and then to ask 
whether the generalization about "the spirit of comity" follows from 
that image. Doesn't the description conjure up something like: (1) a 
miscreant Vermonter, one Jacob, who purchases a slave in 1793, 
( ab )uses her for a while, then turns her out to starve when she is old 
and feeble; and (2) some high-minded Town Selectmen who want to 
require the miscreant Jacob to do the "decent slaveowner's thing" -
support her in old age and infirmity? However, Jacob escapes his 
rightful burden because the 1793 bill of sale was never valid under 
Vermont law. Then, ignoring the resulting pitiful welfare situation, 
Finkelman winds up on a "congenial" note of interpretation regard-
ing the attitudes of the Vermont Supreme Court. 
There are two problems here. One has to do with getting the 
53. 2 NJ.L. 393 (1807). 
54. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 76-77. 
55. Id. at 78-79. 
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facts of the case straight. The other has to do with their appropriate 
interpretation. 
As to facts, my going to the Vermont Reports and reading the 
case was triggered by a mere typographic suspicion, a dim recollec-
tion that Chief Judge Tyler spelled his first name differently than 
Finkelman spelled it in his text - a suspicion that turned out to be 
well-founded.56 A reading of the case also revealed that the bill of 
sale was dated 1783, not 1793 - three years before rather than seven 
years after the passage of a 1786 state law prohibiting the export of 
slaves from the state.57 
Reading further disclosed that the miscreant Jacob's account of 
what had happened and what the Selectmen were up to was rather 
different from Finkelman's. According to Jacob's counsel, certain 
inhabitants of Windsor had "inveigled ... [the black woman] from 
her master's family [Jacob's family] and service by the syren [sic] 
songs of liberty and equality . . . ."58 She went off and worked for 
them, while he, miscreant Jacob, "did not attempt . . . to reclaim 
her. As an inhabitant of the state, in obedience to the constitution, 
he considered that he could not hold her as a slave."59 
There is one final, interesting aspect of the case that Finkelman 
doesn't bother to tell us. It is that Jacob was himself a colleague of 
Royall Tyler on the Vermont Supreme Court. Judge Jacob excused 
himself from participating in the case for obvious reasons. 60 Why 
doesn't Finkelman tell us this? Surely Judge Jacob's involvement has 
some bearing on interpreting the case's outcqme as an indicator of 
the attitudes of the Vermont Supreme Court. 
As to the interpretation of Judge Jacob's case, what does the sub-
stantive situation and the case holding really indicate about comity? 
Does it say anything at all about the issues that later were so to 
arouse Southerners - whether they could sojourn, visit, or even 
transit without losing their slaves? Given that Jacob was off the case 
and apparently had not attempted to prevent the black woman's de-
parture (surely he was not seeking to inveigle her west and south to 
some new promised land of slavery across the wide Missouri), what 
real test of comity was there? And this, after all, is the only Vermont 
example given. 
56. Judge Tyler's first name was "Royall,'' not "Royal." 
57. See Selectmen of Windsor v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. at 192, 193. 
58. 2 Tyl. at 196-97. 
59. 2 Tyl. at 197. 
60. 2 Tyl. at 198. 
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Now let us consider the New Jersey case, State v. Quick.61 
Finkelman seems to be considerably less admiring of New Jersey's 
record of protecting an "unlimited right of transit and sojourn for 
non-resident slaveowners and their human 'property' . . . until 
1865"62 than he is of Vermont's. At any rate, he says of Quick: 
Because New Jersey protected the rights of slaveowners only one case 
dealing with the problem of comity and slavery was recorded. State v. 
Quick (1807) involved a slave purchased in New York and brought to 
New Jersey. The case was a classic problem in the choice of laws. 
New York prohibited the selling of a slave for export. New Jersey, on 
the other hand, had no objection to the introduction of new slaves, 
provided they were purchased outside the state and not resold within 
the state. There was no New Jersey law that could free the slave. In 
reaching his decision, Justice William Pennington noted that if the 
slave was free under New York law, "it must be that he was free before 
he was brought into this State; for . . . New York cannot extend into 
this State and attach itself to any act done here, in order to give him 
freedom."63 
So much for what Pennington ruled. As to what Finkelman thinks 
Pennington might have done, "Pennington could have determined 
that under New York law the slave was free before he came to New 
Jersey, because the intent to export a slave purchased in the state was 
an offense, as well as the actual exportation"64 and that "since the 
exportation began with preparations in New York, the crime against 
New York law was committed before the slave ever reached New 
Jersey."65 But Pennington rendered no such interpretation. 
Instead he ruled that the slave would be free under New York law only 
if the original purchase of the slave was made with the intent of ille-
gally exporting the slave from New York. Since the purchase took 
place two years prior to the removal, Pennington held that the 
purchase had not been an attempt to evade the New York law; thus the 
slave was not freed.66 
Finkel.man's moral is that the decision "indicates a certain bias. . . . 
Unlike other northern states that leaned toward liberty while at the 
same time granting rights to nonresidents, New Jersey gave rights to 
all slaveowners and refused to enforce a New York law for the bene-
fit of a slave owned by a New Jersey resident."67 Thus, according to 
Finkelman, "State v. Quick and the protection offered slaves in 
61. 2 NJ.L. 393 (1807). 
62. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 76. 
63. Id. at 76-77 (footnote omitted). 
64. Id. at 77 (emphasis in original). 
65. Id. (emphasis in original). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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transit ... indicate that New Jersey was one of the least pro-free-
dom states in the North."6 8 
Now, let us picture to ourselves, drawing from Finkel.man's nar-
rative, what has been going on. Does it seem that the New Jersey 
judges didn't do what they really ought to have done - free the 
slave by applying New York law in the spirit of comity against the 
New Jersey resident who exported the slave from New York? Partic-
ularly, don't you get the impression that this is a New Jersey 
Supreme Court case? The book itself clearly gives that impression 
- given that the case is embedded between discussions of New York 
and New England appellate cases, and given that Finkelman treats 
the result as indicative of the stand on comity of the whole state of 
New Jersey. Yet Quick was not a state supreme court case at all. 
Rather, it was a case in the Bergen, New Jersey circuit decided by 
one judge. 
Further, doesn't one get the impression that "Quick" must be 
either the slave seeking freedom or his owner, and that the owner is 
the exporter from New York and importer into New Jersey? Doesn't 
one get the sense that since the owner has been so naughty in avoid-
ing the intent of the New York statute it would serve him right to 
lose the slave? Lastly, is it not obvious from Finkelman's exposition 
that the core of his objection to Judge Pennington's opinion is that 
the judge ignored the "appropriate" comity implications of the sec-
ond of the New York law's described offenses - one offense being 
exporting a slave purchased in New York and the other offense be-
ing intending to export a slave purchased in New York? 
In fact, Dick was the slave and Quick, his owner, was several 
sales removed from the erring exporter/importer. The export-
ing/importing had not been a recent occurrence. The supposedly 
offensive New York purchase of the slave Dick had taken place not 
two years, but rather some twelve or thirteen years before the trial in 
New Jersey. The New York purchaser was one Sir James Jay who, 
from a time prior to the purchase, had been accustomed to splitting 
his time between residing in New York and residing on his Bergen 
County, New Jersey plantation. At some point after purchasing the 
slave Dick, Sir James-had sent him from Sir James' New York house 
to his New Jersey farm. The alert reader will note that this circum-
stance is not first cousin, let alone identical twin, to the kind ofNew-
York-law-evading action that Finkelman's narrative contemplates. 
At some time after sending the slave from his New York to his New 
68. Id. at n.27. 
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Jersey property, seemingly about two years, Sir James committed 
Dick to jail for what the defense lawyer described as "bad behav-
ior."69 Sir James later "sold him out ofit" to get rid of him as troub-
lesome.70 The slave "passed through the hands of several masters, 
when at length the defendant bought him."71 
If that account of the events, which is the best I can piece to-
gether, is correct, it does not provide evidence of any wicked ex-
porter/importer behavior contravening New York law - even the 
version of the New York law that Finkelman has given us. The case 
simply does not establish any intent to export from New York at the 
time of Sir James' (not Quick's) purchase of Dick. 
Moreover, Finkelman reads the New York law as penalizing a 
person who purchases a New York slave with the intent to export. I 
put the best gloss possible on Finkelman's prose which, read liter-
ally, states that the New York statute sought to punish intent to ex-
port without any act. What did the New York law say? According to 
the New Jersey Court Report, it penalized anyone who "shall, at any 
time, purchase or buy, or . . . take or receive any slave, with intent to 
remove, export, or carry such slave . . . to any other place without 
the State and there to be sold."72 The slave, as I (and Judge Pen-
nington) read the New York statute, was to go free if "Sir James, 
immediately on purchasing him, had brought him into [New Jersey], 
and sold him."73 But, if anything at all is plain about the case, it is 
that neither Sir James nor the not-so-fast Mr. Quick had such an 
intent. 
To reach this conclusion is to observe a possible cause · of 
Finkelman's analytic slip and to suggest a problem of authorial atti-
tude that bedevils much of An Impeifect Union. Pushing the case 
facts around, Finkelman seeks to open up a hole toward freedom. 
Then he blames the court in question for not leading the slave 
through the illusory hole he creates. On any objective analysis, the 
circumstances of Quick's case and the New York law as stated in the 
New Jersey Reports require the result that Judge Pennington 
reached. Finkelman's interpretations of Jacob and Quick are not the 
only "strong readings" - or, as I would put it, ''headsfrong misread-
ings" -that occur inAn Imperfect Union.14 
69. 2 NJ.L. at 394. 
70. 2 NJ.L. at 394. 
71. 2 NJ.L. at 393. 
72. 2 NJ.L. at 394. 
73. 2 NJ.L. at 395. 
74. Space does not permit instancing all the cas~ where I think it at least arguable that 
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2. Judicial Motivation and Attitudes 
Finkel.man's moral sensibilities, joined with his radical "instru-
mentalist" tendency to treat lines of case outcomes as dependent 
variables of political inputs, lead him to explain variations among 
the states of a single section in ways that I find less than ~mpelling. 
I shall take just a few examples by way of illustration. 
a. Variation from Aves. One variation in outcomes among 
Northern jurisdictions is that the State Supreme Courts of Illinois, 
Indiana, and New Jersey did not decide to follow Commonwealth v. 
Aves15 when similar cases came before them.76 Finkelman "ex-
plains" these decisions by observing that all three states had weak 
antislavery movements, major borders with slave states, and were 
Negrophobic Democratic strongholds.77 Putative statewide political 
and geographic characteristics tum themselves into direct determi-
nants of case decisions. Finkel.man's explanation is not made more 
satisfactory by relegating to a footnote78 the State of California - a 
jurisdiction that also rejected Aves19 but did not share similar geo-
political characteristics. 
b. Judicial motivations or reasoning. Finkelman sometimes has 
difficulty with judicial motivations or reasoning, occasionally reach-
Finkelman's reading is either wrong or leaves out something. Instances include the following, 
however. With respect to Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821), a case that 
Finkelman describes as an unfortunate inveigling of slaves to return from Ohio to Virginia, see 
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 89, two alternate readings of the case are already in circula-
tion. At least one is more plausible than Finkelman's. He ignores both. Compare R. COVER, 
JUSTICE ACCUSED 95-98 (1975), with Nash, Reason of Slavery, supra note 11, at 134. With 
respect to Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1851), Finkelman uses the case to show that the 
Ohio court remained "antislavery until the Civil War" but omits telling us that the court split 
closely, 3-2, on the case. Perhaps the most egregious "strong misreading" is his version of John 
Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1821). The case now is best 
remembered for Marshall's lengthy defense of the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction 
in the case notwithstanding the eleventh amendment and the attacks of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals. But there is a second part to it-namely, whether the defendants could be punished 
by the State of Virginia for selling in Virginia, contrary to state law, federal lottery tickets 
putatively authorized by a District of Columbia lottery commission. Considering the case as 
one of many relating to the possibility of Northern and Southern courts denying right of pas-
sage to slaves notwithstanding the commerce clause, Finkelman states, "in Cohens . . . the 
court had upheld a Virginia prohibition on the sale oflottery tickets, even though the lottery 
had been authorized by Congress." P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 260 n.60. He makes it 
seem as if Cohens endorsed a state's right to regulate interstate commerce against congres-
sional will. But Marshall's opinion held no such thing. Rather, it allowed Virginia to prosecute 
a Norfolk sale explicitly on the ground that Congress intended to authorize the sale oflottery 
tickets only within the District of Columbia. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 119. 
75. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). 
16. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 127. 
11. See id. 
18. Id. at 127 n.4. 
19. See Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 (1858). 
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ing conclusions without any buttressing evidence. Thus, at a crucial 
juncture in the book's argument, he asserts of Southern judicial 
motivations: "[F]idelity to the law itself may go a long way in ex-
plaining why the courts in a number of Southern states were willing 
to liberate slaves who had lived in free states. It was not sympathy 
for blacks nor a desire to end slavery that led to these decisions."80 
Given the number of occasions on which Southern judges did ex-
press something much like sympathy for blacks,81 this sweeping con-
clusion is not well supported. At other times Finkelman has 
difficulty believing evidence when, arguably, the difficulty lies in his 
own mind-set. Thus, of a Kentucky case, Carney v. Hampton,82 
which involved the same New York anti-exportation-to-sell statute 
as State v. Quick, 83 he observes: 
[T]he Kentucky Supreme Court refused to enforce New York's prohi-
bition against selling slaves and removing them from the State. 'J'.he 
Kentucky court would not "believe" that New York "intended wholly 
to prevent the exportation of slaves" and thus ruled that a man who 
had purchased a slave without any intention to export him and then 
later left that state had not in fact violated New York's law. Ken-
tucky's inability to ''believe" that New York could truly mean to end 
all exportation of slaves indicates how difficult it was for states to grant 
comity to each other's laws. In this case New York's interests were so 
alien to those of Kentucky that the latter state simply found it impossi-
ble to understand New York's law.84 
Here is palpable confusion. First, the New York law prohibited 
purchasing-and-exporting, not selling-and-exporting. Once you sell, 
the sold "object" is difficult to remove from the state - it's no longer 
yours. Second, the Kentucky court's discussion of the various excep-
tions to the law85 makes plain the fact that New York did not intend 
to forbid all exportation. Third, because a neutral reading of the 
New York statute indicates that it is a prohibition against purchase-
with-intent-to-sell-out-of-state, 86 it is hard to resist the conclusion 
80. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 182. 
81. See generally Nash, Fairness and Fonna/ism in the Trials of Blacks in the Slate Supreme 
Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REv. 64 (1970); Nash, Negro Rights., Unionism, and Great-
ness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John Bellon 
O'Nea/1, 21 S.C. L. REv. 141 (1969). 
82. 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 228 (1826). 
83. 2 N.J.L. 393 (1807); see notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text. 
84. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 71. 
85. Exceptions included, for example, taking one's own slaves from New York to settle in 
another jurisdiction and inheritance of slaves by a non-New Yorker who removed them with-
out intent to sell. Camey v. Hampton, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 228, 230 (1826). 
86. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. 
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that Finkelman, not Kentucky, "simply found it impossible to un-
derstand New York's law'' because his perspectives are so "alien." 
Finally, a neutral reading of Carney v. Hampton indicates that 
the Kentucky court did a passable job of observing comity. 
Finkelman fails to tell the reader that the lower court's :finding for 
the defendant slave owner was "reversed . . . and the cause . . . re-
manded for new proceedings"87 because the lower court erred by 
instructing the jury to find for the slaveowner and against the claim-
ant slave if it believed that the purchaser-and-exporter of the plain-
tiff's mother "did not sell her, but gave her to his daughter."88 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court said that the instruction was improper be-
cause it overlooked the fact that a change of heart after exportation 
and a pursuant decision not to sell (but rather to keep or give) would 
not bar the slave's right to claim freedom. That right accrued once 
there had been purchase-with-intent-to-export and could not be 
abridged by later change of intent. 89 Thus, the Kentucky Court 
surely did not in this case show a complete inability to understand or 
to observe comity. 
Arguably, Finkel.man's understanding goes astray on a number 
of other occasions for like reasons - for example, when he :finds it 
difficult to credit that not only in the North but also in the South 
there might be a difference between a state's legislature and its ap-
peals court on some slavery issue, that there might be something less 
than complete and intense pro-slavery unity. Another instance is 
when he discounts as an example of anti-abolition sentiment an Illi-
nois Senator's observation in the United States Senate that, until the 
late 1840s, "'the courts of the slave States had been much more lib-
eral in their adjudications upon the question of slavery than the free 
-States.' "90 So too, he seems to wear analytic blinders when he con-
clusively characterizes as anti-abolitionist a New York judge who, 
following his understanding of New York law, first freed slaves in 
transit with their master and mistress from Virginia through New 
York City to Texas, and then gave money to the cause of the sud-
denly impecunious master and mistress. 
87. 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) at 233. 
88. 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) at 229. 
89. 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) at 229. 
90. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 99. Compare id. at 99 & n.101 (where Finkelman feels 
compelled to qualify and explain the statement quoted in text), with id. at 150-55 (where 
Finkelman has no difficulty perceiving an attitudinal split between the Illinois legislature and 
the Illinois Supreme Court). Finkelman's book also omits discussion of almost all of the in-
stances of similar legislative/judicial splits in attitudes and manumission policy in the South-
ern states. 
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There is no point in belaboring these sorts of arguable interpreta-
tions, but they do illustrate how Finkelman's argument can push be-
yond the evidence he offers to support it. This in mind, I tum to the 
issue most vital to the overall success of Finkelman's argument -
the collapse of comity during the phase immediately preceding the 
Civil War. 
· D. Sampling and the Question of a Collapse of Southern Comity 
- Finke/man's Problematic Generalizations and the 
Evidence 
At the heart of An Imperfect Union is the contention that during 
the 1840s and 1850s judicial matters went seriously awry in the 
North and South. I will put aside whether Finkelman is right or 
wrong about Northern judicial decisions and concentrate on ten of 
his core generalizations about the Southern judiciaries. I shall argue 
that only one of these ten is unexceptionable, and that the others are 
variously false, simplistic or otherwise problematic, as follows: 
(1) ''The development of ... doctrine in the American South is best 
illustrated by an examination of the case law in four slave states: Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Mississippi."91 (False) 
(2) "[S]outhem courts, gradually at first and then almost in unison, 
began to deny comity to blacks who had lived in the North, where they 
had gained their liberty."92 (False) 
(3) "By 1860 ... most Southern states refused to recognize or uphold 
freedom based on free state residence or sojourn, or even direct eman-
cipation in a free state."93 (False) 
(4) "[F]idelity to law -this impartiality of decisionmaking - began 
to fade in the 1830s and disappeared throughout most of the South 
before 1860. By then fidelity to the institution of slavery was more im-
portant than fidelity to abstract concepts of law."94 (Simplistic) 
(5) "Slave-state courts reflected the attitudes of the people they 
served .... "95 (Simplistic) 
(6) "Kentucky and a few other slave states continued to recognize free-
dom claims based on the laws of other states throughout the antebel-
lum period. But even in these liberal states the trend was moving away 
from decisions in favor of liberty."96 (Unexceptionable, in respect to 
Kentucky) 
(7) ''By the 1850s most of the South had, to one degree or another, 
decided that interstate comity could not extend to cases involving 
91. Id. at 187. 
92. Id. at 179. 
93. Id. at 11. 
94. Id. at 182. 
95. Id. at 234. 
96. Id. at 189. 
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slaves who claimed to be free."97 (Muddy - either trivially true or 
wrong) 
(8) "It would be convenient . . . to argue that southern courts ceased 
granting comity . . . in response to northern decisions denying comity 
to slaveowners in transit. . . . [l]t is not at all clear that the change 
came about in this way."98 (Problematic) 
(9) "[S]outhern courts freed slaves who had spent time in the North 
well before northern courts freed slaves in transit. It surely would be 
absurd to argue that southern jurists reversed their own precedents be-
cause northern jurists had endorsed them."99 (Confused) 
(10) "Within the realm of state actionLemmon [a New York case] rep-
resents the final development in the law of freedom, while Mitchell [a 
Mississippi case] symbolized the ultimate logic of the law of bondage." 
Finkelman concludes that what the dissenting judge in Lemmon, and 
the judge in Mitchell "sensed, but could not admit, was that the legal 
systems of the North and South could no longer coexist."100 
(Problematic) 
I. Finke/man's False Generalizations 
Perhaps the most curious generalization inAn Impeifect Union is 
the assertion that the development oflegal doctrine concerning slav-
ery in the American South is best illustrated by exaroinine case law 
in Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Mississippi.101 A moment's 
thought suggests that the best way of illustrating the development of 
Southern slavery case law is to examine it in all fifteen slave states, 
or at least in all eleven of the secession states. Complete enumera-
tion simply is better than sampling, especially when the ''universe" is 
so small and its component members, the states, are so likely to di-
verge in ways that no sampling technique can control. 
Moreover, given a decision to sample rather than to consider all 
the slave state jurisdictions, the combination of states chosen -
surely not a random selection on Finkelman's part - contains two 
characteristics which suggest that they might make a singularly un-
representative "quad." One characteristic is that Finkelman's sam-
ple contains a greater percentage of nonseceding than seceding slave 
states.102 A second characteristic is that all of the sample states bor-
der the Mississippi River. None is east of the Appalachians; thus, 
97. Id. at 189-90. 
98. Id. at 182-83. 
99. Id. at 183. 
100. Id. at 310. 
101. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 187. 
102. Of the four that did not withdraw from the Union (four states, incidentally, that con-
tained a very small minority of the Union's slaves), Finkelman selects two, or 50%. Of the 11 
states that did withdraw, Professor Finkelman also picks two, or 18%. 
298 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:274 
none is one of the original thirteen colonies. None is one of the older 
slave-holding jurisdictions. To the extent that jurisprudential char-
acteristics vary accordingly, Finkelman's sample will not detect the 
variance. His selection is roughly equivalent to a Northern sample 
consisting of Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and the Minnesota Territory. 
These states might fairly represent the Northern Mississippi Valley 
but, absent any New England or North Atlantic states, would be 
manifestly unreliable as an "all-Northern" s1:1.mple. 
Finkelman's sampling apparently leads him to believe two of his 
other crucial, but incorrect, assertions: that Southern courts began to 
deny comity to blacks wb._o had gained liberty in the North "gradu-
ally at first and then almost in unison" 103 and the closely related 
assertion that by 1860 "most" Southern states rejected claims of free-
dom based on "free-state residence or sojourn, or even direct eman-
cipation in a free state."104 Although indeed related, the two 
assertions are not entirely four-square with each other as to the 
number of Southern states denying comity and as to subjects covered 
in the comity denials. The second generalization tells us only that 
"most" states did so - which presumably means either six or more 
of the seceding states or eight or more of the slave-holding states. 
The first generalization claims more - that the denial was almost 
unanimous by the eve of the Civil War. It also seems to make a 
stronger claim as to the subjects covered - and a counter-intuitive 
one at that. Where the second generalization has most Southern 
states rejecting claims in several circumstances - free state emanci-
pation, free state residence and free state sojourn - the first de-
scribes an almost unanimous denial of claims based on the strongest 
"pro-freedom" situations, where (ex-)slaves had actually gained lib-
erty by judicial action in the North. This is a bit odd, unless we try 
an unusual and very awkward reading of Finkelman's first general-
ization by taking it to mean that although Southern courts nearly 
unanimously did begin to deny comity, they did not finish so doing. 
A glance at relevant cases in the jurisdictions that Finkelman 
omits entirely or handles insufficiently in stray footnotes will show 
that, in any event, both generalizations are false. The only way that 
one can come close to counting a majority of Southern state jurisdic-
tions as denying comity during the period from 1855-1860 is if one 
includes as "failing to grant comity'' courts to whom no such cases 
were appealed during those years. 
103. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 179. 
104. Id. at 11. 
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If part of Finkelman's counting trouble is caused by his peculiar 
sampling, much of the rest results because he isolates what one 
might call the explicit conflict-of-laws/comity cases, with which he 
does deal, from the implicit conflict-of-laws/comity cases,105 with 
which he deals little or not at all. Yet implicit comity cases involved 
judges in allied issues whose disposition should ( especially in the ab-
sence of more explicit conflict-of-laws cases on the relevant dockets) 
be indicative if not dispositive of whether or not the court in ques-
tion was bent on an "anti-comity'' warlike judicial course. 
Whatever the merits of this objection to Finkelman's thesis,106 let 
us for the moment examine the disposition of the last few important 
antebellum cases raising comity issues in each slave state's appellate 
court. To give every advantage to Finkelman's thesis, we shall say 
that it succeeds if either a bare majority (six) of the seceding states or 
a bare majority ( eight) of all of the slave states can be shown to have 
denied comity as a general late antebellum practice. We shall also 
give Finkelman's thesis a leg up by counting the box-score of his 
four sample states as he does: one remaining on the whole disin-
clined to wage judicial war on comity (Kentucky), and three moving 
to an anti-comity position (Mississippi, Missouri, and Louisiana).107 
Finkelman's thesis thus produces: (1) a score of zero for and two 
against comity among the seceding jurisdictions; and (2) a score of 
one for to three against among all the slaveholding jurisdictions. 
What happens if we now add in the states Finkelman doesn't 
sample? 
Let us take the two omitted border states, Maryland and Dela-
ware, first. The fruits ofmy research do not help Finkelman's "off to 
war" thesis. With respect to the Delaware Supreme Court, I cannot 
find any cases that explicitly or implicitly deny the efficacy of other 
states' laws in conferring the benefits of freedom. Indeed, the laws of 
Delaware aimed at the opposite result. An act of 1787 freed slaves 
imported into Delaware "for sale, or otherwise."108 A 1793 act out-
lawed both kidnapping free blacks into slavery and exporting slaves 
for sale without a license. 109 Early judicial decisions favored the 
105. For example, those involving wills that directed out-of-state manumission of slaves in 
instances where the estate was saddled with in-state debts, or wills that permitted slaves to 
choose between Northern freedom and Southern slavery. 
106. I have on an earlier occasion dealt with the dispositions of some thirteen manumis-
sion and comity-related issues in five Southern jurisdictions, and shall not repeat the entire 
demonstration here. See Nash, Reason of Slavery, supra note 11, at 200-02. 
107. There is room for argument about the import of the Louisiana court's holdings, but I 
shall not develop the point here for reasons of space. 
108. Act of Feb. 3, 1787, ch. 145 b, § 7, 2 Del. Laws 884, 886-87. 
109. Act of June 14, 1793, ch. 22 c, 2 Del. Laws 1093. 
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slave. In Negro Guy v. Hutchins, 110 a master who had merely 
brought his slave into Delaware with a cartload of wheat seed to sow 
on his Delaware farm lost his black to liberty. In Negro Abram v. 
Burrows,111 a Maryland master sent a slave, Negro Abram, to work 
one week for the master's brother, who was a tenant on the master's 
Delaware farm, some three miles distant from the master's Maryland 
residence. So doing, the master lost his property in Abram forever. 
Later Delaware decisions ran in the same direction. 112 Maryland 
had much more slavery than Delaware although Maryland's slavery 
docket was by no means comparable to those of states such as North 
Carolina, Tennessee, or Louisiana. Although space limitations 
render impractical a complete analysis of the Maryland decisions, 
brief examination of the five Maryland Court of Appeals cases that 
arose during the 1850s and have some bearing upon matters of com-
ity do not buttress Finkelman's generalizations. Of these five cases, 
only one -Northern Central Railway v. Scholl113 - goes off in an 
"anti-freedom direction." But one must push the analysis very hard 
to argue that the holding in Northern Central Railway indicates a 
reprehensible flouting of comity. The question was whether a rail-
road was liable in Maryland courts for the carelessness of one of its 
ticket agents in selling in Pennsylvania a ticket to a runaway Mary-
land slave notwithstanding a warning to the ticket agent by a third 
party that the black had unlawfully absconded from his Maryland 
master. 114 In the view of Maryland Chief Justice Le Grand, Penn-
sylvania might "forbid its courts to grant redress for the wrong, but it 
cannot oust the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of the injured 
party ... [w]henever the wrong-doer comes within [that State's] 
limits."115 Thus, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied the law 
of the forum and the law of the locus of residence though not of the 
locus of the ticket sale. Any doubts that the Maryland court's han-
ll0. Unreported case, cited in Thoroughgood v. Anderson, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 97, 103-04 n.a, 
qffd., 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 199 (1848). Thoroughgood draws on a judge's notebook of earlier cases. 
Although the notebook is reprinted in DELAWARE CASES, neither Negro Guy nor Negro 
Abram, see text at note 111 ii!fra, appears there. 
111. Unreported case, cited in Thoroughgood v. Anderson, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 97, 102-03 n.a, 
qffd., 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 199 (1848). 
ll2. For example, in State v. Dillahunt, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 551 (1840), and State v. Jeans, 4 
Del. (4 Harr.) 570 (1845), the Delaware Court found a presumption that, at least for the pur-
pose of being a witness, Negroes were not slaves, but free. 
ll3. 16 Md. 331 (1860). On the question of whether Southern slavery decisions could be 
meaningfully pro- or anti-slavery, see Nash, Reason of Slavery, supra note 11, at 156-72. 
ll4. There was contradictory testimony as to whether the warning immediately preceded 
or immediately followed the sale. 16 Md. at 347. The Maryland court treats the case as if the 
priority of the warning had been demonstrated. 16 Md. at 349. 
ll5. 16 Md. at 351. 
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dling of the case might cause are not borne out by the resolutions of 
the other four Maryland cases. In Brown v. Brown,116 the 1858 
Maryland court took an approach to a bequest of freedom that 
surely would have failed before a judiciary hostile to such grants. 
Brown v. Brown upheld a will with several provisions each of which 
would probably have been voided by the Georgia or post-1859 Mis-
sissippi benches. One provision granted freedom after varying terms 
of years during which the slaves were to be hired out. During that 
time they would have been statu liberi with a quasi-free status -
precisely the status that Southern extremist judges feared would pro-
vide bad, envy-inducing examples to other less favored slaves. An-
other provision of the will required that the testator's plantation be 
rented out with the annual proceeds to be spent on the welfare of his 
blacks. That is not the sort of practice that would have commended 
itself to Judge Harris of Mississippi and Mitchell v. Wells 117 fame. 
An 1853 case, Ringgold v. Barley,118 found the Maryland court 
holding - in contrast to an earlier case119 - that a master who had 
taken his Maryland slaves with him to Missouri to establish a farm 
and who farmed there for approximately a year before becoming ill 
and returning to Maryland, lost his slaves on bringing them back 
with him. That is not the sort of ruling that would have commended 
itself to a pro-slavery judge seeking loopholes in the law of domicile 
to benefit the master. Furthermore, in Alexander v. Worthington, 120 
Judge Le Grand observed: 
To permit the heirs at law who have availed themselves of their prox-
imity in blood to obtain administration on the personal estate of the 
testator, to sell the negroes into ceaseless bondage in foreign climes, for 
the purpose of providing for payment of debts which are justly charge-
able on the lands descended to the heirs at law, . . . would seem to be 
an act of injustice of which a court composed of slaveholders . . . 
could not possibly be guilty.121 
I 16. 12 Md. 87 (1858). 
I 17. 37 Miss. 235 (1859); see notes 126-30 infra and accompanying text. 
118. 5 Md. 186 (1853). 
119. The earlier case was Cross v. Black, 9 G. & J. 198 (Md. 1837), which held that time 
spent in Ohio during an abortive trip to Missouri did not, in conjunction with a relevant Mary-
land statute of 1831, operate to divest the master of his property in slaves on return to Mary-
land. The court reached this result despite the fact that the master had signed deeds of 
manumission while in Ohio. Although I can imagine Finkelman arguing that this case showed 
the 1837 Maryland court's disregard for comity with Ohio, the evidence showed fairly clearly 
that a large Ohio anti-slavery crowd had intimidated the master into executing the manumit-
tory devices. See 9 G. & J. at 206. 
120. 5 Md. 471 (1854). 
121. 5 Md. at 494. 
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In Smith v. Smith, 122 decided in the same year, the sale of a statu 
liberi out of Maryland in frustration of a bequest of freedom caused 
the Chief Justice to express in dictum "our condemnation of the con-
trivance, by whoever made, to deprive a helpless negress of the free-
dom to which she was entitled by her master's will. Such conduct 
. . . ought to be visited with the severest penalties of the criminal 
law."123 
Whether mere words or tell-tales of judicial attitudes, these 
passages in Alexander and Smith, in conjunction with the other cases 
discussed, indicate that Maryland should not be included in the 
"warlike" comity-denying "camp" of Mississippi and Missouri. 
Thus, we find that the relevant decisions of three of the four non-
seceding slaveholding states - two of which Finkelman dealt with 
and two of which he ignored- do not support Finkelman's hypoth-
esis. Considering the South as a whole, we now have a tie of three in 
favor of comity (Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland) to three 
against (Mississippi, Louisiana, and Missouri). 
What happens if we examine the records of the slave states that 
did secede? Will we find in the comparison that the Maryland and 
Delaware results are atypical, border-state phenomena? The answer 
is a reasonably clear ''No." Indeed, if there is any real puzzle it is 
that Finkelman could have thought his sample representative. That 
is because abundant evidence contrary to his hypothesis already ex-
ists in other historical analyses for at least four of these nonborder 
states: Texas, Tennessee, and the two Carolinas. 
Texas can be dealt with by quoting a relevant paragraph from 
my 1971 article: 
Between 1845 and 1860, the Texas judges were asked to rule on six 
issues which afforded them ample room to determine either for or 
against liberty: whether a will seeking to free blacks and remove them 
from the state was valid, when Texas law forbade domestic liberation; 
whether slaves could make a legally cognizable choice between free-
dom and slavery; whether interstate comity required Texas to apply an-
other jurisdiction's "pro-freedom" laws; whether a slave could- obtain 
not only freedom but also monetary damages for unlawful detention; 
whether a free black had the right to rescind an agreement selling him-
self into slavery; and whether oral, as distinct from written, gifts of 
freedom were valid. On all six issues the Texas judges aligned them-
selves with the "libertarians."124 
Texas ought to have been reckoned with in a manner more adequate 
122. 6 Md. 496 (1854). 
123. 6 Md. at 500. 
124. Nash, Trial Rights of Blacks, supra note 11, at 630-31 (emphasis added). 
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than the single misleading footnote that Finkelman offers.125 I will 
take the liberty of quoting from my earlier article again. That article 
not only ought to have put Finkelman on notice about Texas specif-
ics, but should have put him on guard with respect to his tendency to 
wave the fire-eating Mississippi decision, Mitchell v. Wells, 126 as if it 
were an amazingly-red red-flag that Finkelman himself had first dis-
covered. To continue: 
In two other cases, the Texas judges followed Tennessee in refusing to 
allow a claim of "interstate comity'' to interfere with an owner's at-
tempt to manumit his slaves. In Jones v. Laney, they refused to accept 
the argument that a Chickasaw Indian's right to free a slave was inva-
lid in Texas because it was contrary to the laws of the state within 
which the "Chickasaw nation" dwelt. ... Neither the state where the 
will had been made nor the State where the suit for freedom was being 
heard, however hostile to manumission their policies might be, could 
abrogate the Indian's right to bestow freedom on his slave.127 
At this point a footnote intervenes: 
Contrast the Mississippi court which, after veering between neutrality 
and libertarianism until the late 1850s refused to recognize the claims 
of comity even to the extent of allowing a former Mississippi slave duly 
freed in Ohio to collect a bequest of money left by her former master in 
Mississippi. Judge William L. Harris insisted that . . . Ohio was deny-
ing comity in freeing blacks at all. He went on ... "[should] Ohio, 
further afflicted with her peculiar philanthropy, . . . claim to confer 
citizenship on the chimpanzee . . . are we to be told that 'comity' will 
require . . . the States not thus demented, to . . . meet the necessities 
of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into . . . this con-
federacy?" In fairness it should be noted that Judge Alex Handy, 
though also an ardent secessionist, delivered a passionate twenty-four 
page dissent, arguing that Harris was adopting ''barbarian rules which 
prevailed in the dark ages."12s 
Finkelman, though frequently making much of Mitchell v. Wells 
from near the outset of An Imperfect Union, 129 does not mention 
Judge Handy's dissent until we get to page 293 and, while featuring 
the "secessionist impulse" in the opinion, nowhere mentions the 
"anti-barbarian objection." Finkelman's Mitchell v. Wells is rather 
like a mini-Southern mirror-image of a Lincoln-Douglas debate 
125. The only Texas case cited in An Imperfect Union's list of cases, see P. FINKELMAN, 
supra note 6, at 364, is Moore's Admr. v. Minerva, 17 Tex. 20 (1856). The list of cases indi-
cates that the sole discussion of Minerva appears at page 189 n.17. Note 17 cites Minerva as 
authority for the proposition that "even in these liberal states the trend was moving away from 
decisions in favor of liberty." Minerva was hardly authority for that. See text accompanying 
note 130 infra. 
126. 37 Miss. 235 (1859). . 
127. Nash, Trial Rights of Blacks, supra note 11, at 634-35 (footnote omitted). 
128. Id. at 635 n.72 (quoting Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 282 (1859)). 
129. See, e.g., P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
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without a "mini-Douglas." To conclude with a final passage from 
my 1971 essay: 
In 1856Moore v. Minerva brought up once again the issue of interstate 
comity, and . . . raised a further question: that of damages due to an 
allegedly freed slave for unlawful detention. . . . Mary Minerva's ap-
peal sought both freedom for herself and her children and damages 
from the administrator of the master's will. In defense, the administra-
tor argued that Minerva's right to freedom under a deed . . . in Ohio 
was forfeited by her illegal entry into Texas and that the laws of Ala-
bama-where her master had ... owned most of his property-barred 
freedom because he had died leaving large debts. . . . Declaring Mi-
nerva and her children free, Lipscomb argued that the claims of Ohio 
law were superior to those of Alabama and Texas .... Finally, in re-
gard to damages, Virginia and Kentucky might . . . deny payment for 
illegal detention. . . . Lipscomb did not agree . . . .130 
Texas, in other words, moves the totals of our pro-comity/anti-com-
ity jurisdictions to one-to-two in the secession states and four-to-
three in the slave states as a whole. 
An examination of Tennessee's cases produces the same results 
- if anything even more clearly. Finkelman disposes of the Tennes-
see position in a footnote that is, frankly, off-the-wall. He says: "Es-
pecially see Virginia and Tennessee cases, which indicate that those 
states remained almost as consistent as Kentucky .... Yet, these 
moderate states showed some change away from comity. Tennes-
see's cases do not provide a large enough sample to draw any clear 
conclusions .... " 131 
Quite apart from the fact that the next-to-last sentence quoted 
seems to contradict its predecessor, the last sentence is simply untrue. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court's slavery docket was among the most 
substantial. Its holdings were surely the most consistently libertarian 
of any of the longer-settled secession states.132 Nowhere in the an-
nals of antebellum Tennessee Reports is there a denial of comity 
claimed on the basis of a reasonable Northern state holding.133 Only 
Tennessee confronted all thirteen of the following issues, answering 
each in the "pro-liberty'' affirmative. Thus Tennessee: (1) assured 
fair hearings of manumission claims; 134 (2) allowed damages for 
wrongful detention in slavery;135 (3) restricted the presumption 
130. Nash, Trial Rights of Blacks, supra note 11, at 635-36. 
131. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 205 n.66. 
132. See Nash, Reason of Slavery, supra note 11, at 123-84, 201 (su=ary table). 
133. Or, for that matter, as far as I can recall, on the basis of an unreasonable Northern 
state comity-related holding. 
134. See, e.g., Sylvia v. Covey, 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 247 (1833) (removal of slaves from owner 
to prevent their sale prior to judicial hearing of their claim to freedom). 
135. See Woodfolk v. Sweeper, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 64 (1840); Matilda v. Crenshaw, 12 
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against freedom of dark skin color; 136 ( 4) relaxed the rules of evi-
dence to permit hearsay testimony in a claim of freedom; 137 (5) pre-
sumed freedom when confronted with defective court records; 138 (6) 
ruled that slaves should be sent to freedom in a place where it was 
permitted even when the will seemed to condition the grant of free-
dom on its being exercised in a particular place;139 (7) awarded lib-
erty to the children of statu liberi;140 (8) ruled in favor of freedom for 
slaves notwithstanding allegations of testator insanity;141 (9) winked 
at "quasi-emancipations";142 (10) permitted masters to restrict the 
force of anti-manumission statutes by taking slaves out of state to 
free them, then upholding the out-of-state bequest; 143 (11) permitted 
slaves to choose between freedom or slavery when the will gave them 
that choice;144 (12) permitted manumission societies to receive be-
quests of slaves and take them to free states, territories, or coun-
tries; 145 and (13) observed comity in giving effect to other states' laws 
concerning freeing slaves and bequeathing property to blacks.146 
There is no record on these issues that even begins to approach 
Tennessee's in scope, number, and consistency. One can get a rough 
Tenn. (4 Yer.) 249 (1833) (permitting a second suit, after a successful first suit for freedom, to 
recover from the ex-master court costs and wages for the time of the first suit's pendency). 
136. Vaughan v. Phebe, 7-8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 389, 400 (1827). 
137. See Isaac v. Farnsworth, 40 Tenn. (3 Head.) 189, 191 (1859) (freeing a slave sold 
absolutely in a written conveyance by permitting introduction of oral evidence that the slave 
had had an oral understanding that he would be freed after eight years; "Perhaps in no case 
was the proof ever more irreconcilably conflicting. . . . [But] it is revolting to see to what an 
extent some men will go against the rights of the weak, in the eager pursuit of gain."); Miller v. 
Denman, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 156, 158 (1835) (court statement that it had extended "the right to 
introduce hearsay evidence to the utmost limit and further than other courts of high authority 
have gone . . ."). 
138. See Elias v. Smith, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 14 (1845). 
139. See Lewis v. Daniel, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 177 (1849). 
140. See Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 153 (1834). The court dis.missed a contrary 
Kentucky holding with the words, "With the reasons for this decision we are not satisfied," 14 
Tenn. (6 Yer.) at 163, and criticized the Virginia holding in Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 
Rand.) 228 (1824), as "a most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in prejudice of 
human liberty .... " 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) at 163. The Harris decision was reaffirmed unani-
mously (including the vote of Judge Nathan Green, who had dissented in Hollis) in Hartsell v. 
George, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 189 (1842). 
141. See Gass' Heirs v. Gass' Executor, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 207 (1842). 
142. See Elias v. Smith, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 14 (1845). 
143. See Blackmore v. Negro Phill, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 297, 307-09 (1835) (statement to the 
effect that emancipation in the North would be recognized as valid in Tennessee even if the 
master had intended to evade Tennessee laws restricting grants of freedom). 
144. See Stephenson v. Harrison, 40 Tenn. (3 Head.) 500, 505 (1859) (also reaffirming that 
slaves had standing to sue in court and rejecting the contrary view of some then-recent South-
ern decisions with the words, "It would be entirely inconsistent with our liberal slave and 
emancipation Code, let others be as they may.") (emphasis added). 
145. See Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 78, 84-86 (1834). 
146. See Blackmore v. Negro Phill, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 297 (1835). 
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sense of the differences by comparing results in five jurisdictions on 
these thirteen issues. North Carolina's court (the runner-up) gave 
eight yeses, two noes, and did not hear three of these issues. South 
Carolina gave three clear yeses, did not hear three issues, and split 
among its judges and chancellors on the remaining seven. Virginia 
had three consistent yeses, one clear no, and split on the remaining 
nine issues. The Georgia court (the single Southern court whose ju-
risprudence closely resembles that of the post-Mitchell Mississippi 
court) delivered one yes and seven noes on the eight issues that it 
heard.147 
For Finkelman to tell us that there is not enough Tennessee data 
to draw any clear conclusions is astonishing. For our purposes, at 
least two conclusions are quite clear. First, counting Tennessee, the 
box scores in favor of comity are now: within the secession states 
only, two-to-two; among all the slave jurisdictions, five-to-three. 
Second, had Finkelman chosen to "sample" Tennessee rather than 
Mississippi or Louisiana, his conclusions might have been quite dif-
ferent. With a better "spread," his extrapolations to the South as a 
whole might have been more accurate. 
To continue, I would argue that neither Carolina judiciary had 
clearly swung over to ''war-like anti-comity'' by the time of the firing 
on Fort Sumter. That North Carolina did not is plain from any 
number of cases but especially from two in the 1850s. In December 
1853, Judge Richmond Pearson upheld, inAlvany v. Powell, 148 a be-
quest of over $9000 to slaves freed and taken out of state by the 
master's executor. The circumstances are similar, though not identi-
cal, to those in Mitchell v. Wells .149 But the judicial reactions are 
dissimilar in the extreme. Where Harris of Mississippi fulminated 
about chimpanzees and comity, Pearson of North Carolina stated 
that "the humanity of our laws strikes off his fetters at once, and 
says, go 'enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' " 150 An-
other case, Redding v. Findley, 151 decided at the late date of Decem-
ber 1858, expressly permitted slaves given a choice by their owner's 
will to choose between slavery and freedom, thus upholding the very 
sort of "choice in the will" provision that madly pro-slavery judges 
thundered should be voided for allowing an object to exercise free 
will. 
147. See Nash,Rearon of Slavery, supra note 11, at 201. 
148. 54 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) 39 (1853). 
149. 37 Miss. 235 (1859). 
150. 54 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) at 43. 
151. 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 210 (1858). 
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There is, in sum, no .reason to consider North Carolina slavery 
jurisprudence less typical of the Southern legal movement relating to 
the comity issues than that of either (and fairly similar) Tennessee or 
(and quite different) that of Mississippi or Georgia. Thus, we score, 
so far: the seceding states alone, three-to-two for comity; the slave 
states, six-to-three for comity. 
It is not practical at this juncture to explore the comity-related 
jurisprudence of the other six slave jurisdictions in quite the detail 
that we have so far. But it is not altogether necessary to our present 
purpose, in part because to resolve the point at issue we have only to 
"count" as far as is needed to determine whether a majority can be 
found "against comity," and in part because the evidence regarding 
some of the remaining six is so plain as to require little debate. 
The latter is the case with respect to three jurisdictions - Geor-
gia, Florida, and Arkansas. Georgia belongs on the anti-comity side 
of the ledger152 - though admittedly the court majority was occa-
sionally restrained by contrary precedent. The evidence from Flor-
ida is sparse because slavery litigation in that state was rare. 
However, what there is does not support Finkelman's thesis. In the 
only case directly raising a comity issue, Sibley v. Maria, 153 the Flor-
ida court in 1849 interpreted an 1820 South Carolina anti-manumis-
sion statute in a way that freed a South Carolina slave removed to 
Florida, notwithstanding the fact that eight years earlier the South 
Carolina legislature had rebuffed the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals for choosing that same interpretation. Indeed, as Sibley's 
counsel expressly noted before the Florida Court, the South Caro-
lina Equity Court had in the intervening years altered its interpreta-
tion to follow that legislative judgment.154 There was a second 
comity aspect to Sibley v. Maria. Since both interpretations agreed 
that manumission in South Carolina would have been illegal, in or-
der to free Maria it was necessary to presume that she had been re-
moved to Ohio ( designated in the testator's alternate instruction) and 
that she had there posted the required $500 good behavior bond. 
Neither presumption was very likely to be accurate. Yet the court so 
presumed despite the absence of any Ohio record of manumission.155 
Consequently, I disagree with Finkelman and would score Florida 
pro-comity. 
The same may be said for Arkansas. As I have argued else-
152. See Reid, supra note 11, at 578-81; Stephenson & Stephenson, supra note 11, at 602. 
153. 2 Fla. 553 (1849). For a detailed discussion, see A. Nash, supra note 30, at 337-43. 
154. 2 Fla. at 557. 
155. 2 Fla. at 555-56. 
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where, 156 what evidence we have of the not-very-well-known judges 
of that state's antebellum appellate court goes generally and strongly 
to the view that its members, though themselves sympathetic to the 
peculiar institution and much aware of external pressures upon it, 
nonetheless strove for neutrality of judicial decision making. A 
statement of Judge Hubert Fairchild on the very eve of Civil War, in 
July 1860, well exemplifies this: 157 
The question of freedom should be determined . . . solely upon its 
legal aspects, without partiality to an applicant for freedom, because he 
may be defenseless, and a member of an inferior race, and certainly 
without prejudice to his kind and color, and without regard to the sin-
cere convictions that all candid, observing men must entertain, that a 
change from the condition of servitude and protection, to that of being 
free negroes, is injurious to the community, and more unfortunate to 
the emancipated negro than to anyone else. 158 
Though speaking with a forked racist tongue, Judge Fairchild in 
1860 freed slaves slated to receive liberty, notwithstanding an 1859 
Arkansas statute forbidding all post-mortem manumission. Georgia 
and Mississippi judges of the Lumpkin and Harris "anti-comity" sort 
surely would not have so held. 
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Comity was favored five-to-three among the seceding states alone, 
and eight-to-four among all the slaveholding jurisdictions. On my 
reading of the cases in the various jurisdictions that we have so far 
156. See A. Nash, supra note 30, at 333-36. 
157. Finkelman cites only one Arkansas case, Rheubottom v. Sadler, 19 Ark. 491 (1858), 
apparently as evidence of an anti-comity inclination. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 190 
n.18. The case does not bear out any such iniputation. 
158. Phebe v. Qajllin, 21 Ark. 490, 500 (1860). 
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considered, and ignoring any doubting queries as to Finkelman's 
readings of his "own four States," and without giving the best 
"strong reading" of Virginia, South Carolina, and Alabama cases, 
then the notion that denial of comity was almost unanimous on the 
eve of the Civil War is plainly false whichever way one counts. 
Moreover, Finkelman's related generalization - that most Southern 
states began to reject comity-based claims of freedom - is false at 
least for slaveholding states as a whole. After all, as a majority of 
those states did not reject comity, "most" cannot be "against." And 
if anything is obvious at all, it is that the Southern states did not deny 
comity "almost in unison." 
Thus, Finkelman's "strong reading" is a misreading. His 
"weaker reading" is also a misreading for the slaveholding states as a 
whole. To prove his point for the seceding states alone, he would 
have to demonstrate that the judicial behavior in the three states we 
have not looked at support his hypothesis. While I do not propose to 
conduct a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction examination of the remaining 
states in order to show the impossibility of such a demonstration, I 
shall make two quick points going in that direction. First, an exami-
nation of the South Carolina Court of Appeals under the leadership 
of Judge John Belton O'Neall suggests that comity's foes in that state 
lost out at the highest judicial level.159 Second, even Finkelman 
seems to think that an "anti-comity case" against the Virginia Court 
of Appeals is not very strong.160 
These observations made, it is possible to show quite swiftly the 
problems with Professor Finkelman's other generalizations. 
2. Two Simplistic Generalizations 
Finkelman asserts that "fidelity to law - this impartiality of de-
cision making - began to fade in the 1830s and disappeared 
throughout most of the South before 1860" and also that "fidelity to 
. . . slavery was more important than fidelity to abstract concepts of 
law."161 There are two difficulties here. 
First, assuming that "fidelity to law'' and "impartiality of deci-
sion-making" are fungible and obvious entities, the evidence that 
either one or (fungibly) both disappeared throughout most of the 
South simply is not there - assuming also, of course, that here as 
elsewhere in An Imperfect Union Finkelman is talking about states' 
159. See Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John Belton O'Nea/1, 21 S.C. L. REv. 141, 175 (1969). 
160. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 189 n.17. 
161. Id. at 182. 
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appellate courts and not about plantation (in)justice or lynch-mobs. 
The difficulty is similar to that which we have found in our enumera-
tion of comity-related holdings. Professor Finkelman's generaliza-
tions about Southern appellate judiciaries have, exposed to mundane 
facts, a Cheshire cat aspect about them: they tend to disappear. 
The second difficulty relates to the assumption just made argu-
endo - namely, that there is something clear and certain called "fi-
delity to law," that, moreover, can be measured against something 
else called "fidelity to slavery." 
Two oversimplifications are intertwined here. The first lies in 
Finkelman's unstated major premise that by 1860 Southern appellate 
judges were, willy-nilly and by the force of greater historical events, 
placed in the awkward position of having to choose between "ab-
stract concepts oflaw'' and "slavery." Again, our examination so far 
suggests that for many Southern judges this was simply not so. 
The second oversimplification is what Marxist historians might 
call a "bourgeois oversimplification." That is to say, there is a hid-
den identification of "law'' with certain identifiable values that "rea-
sonable men" would agree about. On this view of the matter, law 
that does not display these values in the "right" hierarchy is implic-
itly "not law." The latter half of the generalization, in other words, 
is arguably simplistic because of its legal ontology. It conflates 
"good law'' and ''true law'' and sets up a polar opposite, also con-
flated, which is sometimes thought of just as "bad law" but which 
often is thought of as ''un-law'' or "not law." It is, if you will, a 
simplifying bourgeois variant of "natural lawism" that is bother-
somely afoot. 
The problem with another of Finkelman's generalizations can be 
put in a single sentence. It is not very helpful to assert that "slave 
state courts reflected the attitudes of the people they served"162 with-
out specifying further: (a) how they "reflected"; (b) whom they 
"served"; and (c) whether the "reflecting" was in some fashion 
unique to the slave South or whether such "reflecting" as occurred 
was merely an instance of a general American attitude. 
3. Muddy, Confused, or Otherwise Problematic Generalizations 
Finkelman generalizes that by the 1850s "most of the South had, 
to one degree or another, decided that interstate comity could not 
extend to cases involving slaves who claimed to be free." 163 This is 
162. Id. at 234. 
163. Id. at 189-90. 
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muddy. If "most of the South" means a majority of all adult 
Southerners, then there is no practical way of verifying the conten-
tion. If "most of the South" means "most Southern appellate court 
judges," then the statement is either false or meaninglessly true. It is 
false if ''to one degree or another'' means roughly to cover the span 
from "somewhat disinclined to extend comity" to ''very disinclined 
to extend comity." It is meaninglessly true if "to one degree or an-
other'' includes roughly the range from "not so deciding" to "defi-
nitely deciding." That includes almost every viewpoint. The 
resulting "truth" is meaningless because the sentence's opposite -
"most . . . had, to one degree or another, decided that interstate 
comity could be extended" - is equally true. 
Two generalizations deserve treatment together because both aim 
at explaining the shift in Southern slavery jurisprudence that 
Finkelman (rightly or wrongly) perceives. The first of these asserts 
that although "it would be convenient . . . to argue" that the decline 
in Southern tendencies to grant comity was a "response to northern 
decisions denying comity to slaveowners in transit. . . . it is not at 
all clear that the change came about in this way."164 The other gen-
eralization notes that Southern courts liberated slaves ''who had 
spent time in the North well before northern courts freed slaves in 
transit" and then concludes that "[i]t surely would be absurd to ar-
gue that southern jurists reversed their own precedents because 
northern jurists had endorsed them."165 
These sentences are both important and artless. They are impor-
tant in two ways. First, they are part of a central passage in which 
Finkelman seeks to explain the course of Southern comity-related 
adjudications in a fashion that exculpates Northern courts from 
causing any Southern reversal, and that lays responsibility more gen-
erally on the changing climate of opinion North and South. 
Second, the sentences are important because of what their very 
artlessness gives away. Their artlessness consists primarily in two 
parts. Part one lies in the tell-tale phrase, "it would be convenient." 
Convenient to what? It might be convenient because it would sus-
tain, according to Finkelman, "some legal historians"166 who have 
argued that Southern courts "ceased granting comity . . . in re-
sponse to northern decisions denying comity to slaveowners in 
transit."167 I suspect that, in fact, this would prove inconvenient to 
164. Id. at 182-83. 
165. Id. (emphasis in original). For similar statements, see id. at 234-35. 
166. Finkelman cites only one, Don Fehrenbacher. See id. at 183. 
167. Id. at 183. 
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Finkelman just because it would be convenient for Fehrenbacher, 
whom Finkelman is seeking to discredit on the issue. And it would 
be convenient (read "in convenient to Finkelman") for the purpose of 
"exculpating" Southern judicial behavior. That it would be 
in convenient to Finkelman is strongly suggested by the wording of 
the other generalization's conclusion - which amounts to the sec-
ond artlessness of the analysis. 
· A close look at what Finkelman says reveals that he does not say 
what I imagine most readers would, after a quick reading, tell you he 
had said. How so? The second generalization contains two 
sentences that, on hurried inspection, appear to be four-square both 
with each other and with the notion that the decline in Southern 
grants of comity was a "response to northern decisions denying com-
ity to slaveowners in transit." Quickly read, the second generaliza-
tion appears to tell us: (1) that Southern courts freed slaves on the 
basis of certain conditions or events obtaining in the North before 
Northern courts did the same sort of thing; (2) that it would be silly 
to think that Southern courts got annoyed because Northern courts 
started to follow Southern precedents; and (3) that therefore, the 
Southern reaction must have originated in some other reason - a 
reason not traceable to Northern judicial behavior. 
But Finkelman doesn't really establish this at all. Of course it is 
true that it would be absurd to argue that "Southern jurists reversed 
their own precedents because northern jurists had endorsed them." 
But in fact, Southern jurists never did what too quick a reading of 
Finkelman's generalizations would suggest they did - free slaves 
whose masters had "transitted" them across the North. 
The vagueness of the phrase "freed slaves who had spent time," 
is critical to the consequent misreading. All that earlier Southern 
courts actually did in this connection was to free in some instances 
either slaves who had worked for a considerable period of time with 
their masters' permission in free states or slaves who had been 
brought into Northern states for periods exceeding some statutory 
period not perceived by Southern courts as intolerably short. In ad-
dition, these courts sometimes permitted Southern masters to evade 
the restrictive terms of Southern anti-manumission laws by taking 
favored slaves to the North, there executing manumissions in ac-
cordance with Northern law, and then returning south. 
But these Southern courts had never freed slaves from the grasp 
of masters in transit through free territories. Of course, it would be 
absurd to suppose that Southern courts reacted adversely to the 
Northern courts that followed Southern precedents. But that was 
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not at all what Northern courts of the later antebellum era began to 
do. 
Finkelman's generalizations on this matter reveal a crucial flaw 
in his mode of analysis. He fails to work out what is needed for a 
satisfactory analysis of the problem of comity and antebellum slav-
ery: a "neutral model" of what comity might be said to require, 
under what circumstances, and under what readings of "comity." 
The consequences of this analytic flaw are several. One is that it 
makes possible uncritical assertions such as the last of the two gener-
alizations over which we have just paused. It also facilitates 
Finkelman's assertion that the late antebellum years witnessed a 
trend "away from decisions in favor of liberty."168 That is true but 
rather indefinite. A third unfortunate consequence is the aid lent 
Finkelman's attempt to specify further trends away from comity by 
stating that the dissenting judges of Mitchell v. Wells169 and of Lem-
mon v. People 110 "sensed, but could not admit ... that the legal 
systems of the North and South could no longer coexist. ... 
Within the realm of state action Lemmon represented the final devel-
opment in the law of freedom, while Mitchell symbolized the ulti-
mate logic of the law of bondage."171 
Part of this generalization is mere assertion. Finkelman offers no 
convincing evidence that none of the judges in the two cases were 
able to admit that the legal systems of the North and South could not 
coexist. Indeed, Harris of Mississippi seemed boldly to assert the 
point. One other part of this generalization ·is also, as yet, mere as-
sertion. Finkelman declares that Lemmon is a "final development" 
and that Mitchell "symbolized the ultimate logic of the law of bond-
age." Perhaps. Perhaps not. The way that Finkelman states the 
contention prevents the reader from determining whether it is in-
tended as an empirical generalization as to where the laws of the two 
sections were going, or whether it is intended as some kind of deduc-
tive assertion about the necessary evolution of nineteenth century 
American law. 
As we have seen, such an empirical generalization lacks adequate 
supporting evidence. Such a deductive assertion is not susceptible to 
testing within Finkelman's explicit framework, in part because of his 
failure to specify a clear model of what a neutral comity would have 
looked like. It is also so in part because the relations among law-
168. Id. at 189 (footnote omitted). 
169. 37 Miss. 235 (1859). 
170. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
171. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 6, at 310. 
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made-by-judges, law-made-by-legislators, climates of opinion, and 
the underlying forces of economy, society, and polity remain ill-
worked out in An Imperfect Union. 
Finkelman's work does not contain, in other words, an adequate 
key to some of its mystifying and important assertions. For that rea-
son, it is now appropriate to consider Mark Tushnet's approach to 
radical interpretation of American law. Whatever its other virtues 
and vices, it does proceed from an explicit (Marxist) set of assump-
tions about the relations of law, individual, and economy. 
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF A "NON-REDUCTIONIST" MARxIST 
GENERAL 'THEORY OF .AMERICAN LAW 
A. Non-Marxist Criticisms of Tushnet on the Law of Slavery 
Mark Tushnet's much-critiqued The American Law of Slavery, 
1810-1860 has baffled in whole or in part a fair number of lawyers 
and legal historians. Only two of the four main causes of this baffle-
ment have been much pointed out. One is that his writing is less 
clear than it might be. The other is that he proceeds in an ahistorical 
fashion - both "externally'' and "internally." By "externally" I 
mean, pursuant to the usual jargon of legal history,172 that he does 
not relate the legal history with which he is grappling to the society, 
polity, and economy "external to" the law. Thus, for example, 
Wiecek asks: 
What then accounts for the relative "liberalism"· . . . of the early Mis-
sissippi Court . . . and the harsh posture of the later Mississippi court 
... ? IfTushnet had explored outside the case reports, he would have 
discovered that the minds of white southerners were traumatized by a 
series of incidents ... that led them universally to repudiate it [rela-
tive "liberalism"] with a . . . garrison mentality that, as one of its nec-
essary consequences, suppressed the humanity of the slaves.173 
Wiecek then lists a set of well-known events beginning with the 
1819-1820 congressional debates surrounding Missouri's admission 
to statehood and ending with Nat Turner's Virginia rebellion in 
1831. He continues: "Judicial attitudes changed promptly and re-
flexively. . . . I . . . suggest that . . . obvious events outside the le-
gal arena more readily explain southern judicial behavior."174 
Putting aside the problematic historical question whether and how 
172. See Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in Amer/• 
can Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SOCY. REv. 9 (1975). 
173. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 281. 
174. Id. at 282. 
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directly judicial attitudes in fact "promptly changed,"175 we can at 
least see the main criticism directed against the writing of legal his-
tory: the contention that a better (read "simpler'') explanation can 
be found in the law's "external" reflexive response to the larger polit-
ical world. 
By "internally'' I mean, again pursuant to legal-historical jargon, 
the criticism that Tushnet does not get the order of events straight 
within the law - within its relevant cases and statutes, or between 
and among its cases and statutes. Thus, Finkelman observes that 
"Tushnet ... has little regard for chronology .... For example, 
in a 'largely chronological' discussion of Georgia manumission 
cases, Tushnet discusses, in the following order, cases from 1858, 
1860, 1857, 1858, and 1860."176 He also commits, according to 
Finkelman, a spatial error related to this temporal heresy. Tushnet 
makes "no distinctions between the upper South and the lower 
South. He writes about 'the slave states' or 'the South' as if all fifteen 
states were part of a jurisdictional monolith. He quotes from three 
or more state courts without ever mentioning that his materials come 
from different jurisdictions."177 Perhaps worse, from Finkelman's 
viewpoint, Tushnet plays fast and loose with the "internal" data 
when it comes to explaining slavery law's development: "He seri-
ously misstates the facts in State v. Jarrott (p. 112), and alters them 
in his discussion of State v. Tackett (p. 100)."178 
The third of four sources of bafflement is itself composed of two 
factors. One factor is, seemingly, unease that Marxists are around in 
the late twentieth century United States, not, as at mid-century, re-
stricting themselves to stealing A-bomb secrets and attacking the X 
in Xmas, but actually now (re)writing (sacred) American history. 
The other is an American reflex-assumption that Marxist historiog-
raphy will necessarily be intellectually simplistic in its accounting of 
the relationships between economic infra-structure and the super-
structure of ''the law." After all, and especially in America, "no one 
is ever neutral about Marx."179 That, however, does not mean that 
everyone is knowledgeable about Old Karl. Even those of us who, 
educated to think of .Das Kapital as belonging to an "outside the first 
175. The balance of the historiography on the subject suggests that the change was both 
slower than "prompt" and more complicated than merely "reflexive." 
176. Finkelman, supra note 11, at 359. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. Finkelman does not, however, specify how the facts are altered. 
179. E. KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM: LEVY-STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT 53 
(1980). 
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amendment" category of unprotected quasi-obscene literary essays, 
consider ourselves unlikely to be subverted, may be mistaken in how 
we approach Marxist legal analysis. 
To say that is to indicate the fourth, and perhaps the most impor-
tant, source of bafflement that som~ may experience when reading 
Tushnet on the law of American slavery. It comes from not realizing 
that The American Law of Slavery is as much connected to Tushnet's 
intellectual explorations in twentieth century American constitu-
tional law as it is to the debate over nineteenth century slavery law. 
To understand Tushnet on slavery, one must understand Tushnet's 
work as a whole, those "innumerable" articles which Milner S. Ball 
has characterized as "the fallout of a Mt. St. Helen's eruption of 
scholarship."180 That is so in part because of the clues these works 
provide as to the main features of Tushnet's Marxist intellectual to-
pography and in tum as to why Tushnet may make slip-ups that 
from his own angle seem relatively unimportant whereas to a non-
Marxist they seem devastating.1s1 
But there is a more important reason for looking at Tushnet-on-
slavery in light of Tushnet-on-the-American-Constitution-today. 
Tushnet is, among the current generation of American law scholars, 
the only individual who has essayed sustained, serious endeavors 
both in legal history and in constitutional law while being reason-
.ably au courant in a third approach to the law - political science's 
judicial-process-and-behavior approach. In addition, Tushnet says 
he is a Marxist. Is there a potentially important moral for the study 
180. Ball, .Don't .Die .Don Quixote: A Response and Alternative to Tffshnet, Bobbitt, and the 
Revised Texas Version of Constitutional Law, 59 TEX. L. REv. 787, 793 n.42 (1981). 
181. See Watson, Slave Law: History and Ideology (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 1034 
(1982). Briefly, Watson makes the following points about four of Tushnet's chief "case-
studies": 
(a) that Tushnet's argument about the omission of a tort rationale from the leading 
antebellum Southern "fellow servant rule" case, Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 
51 N.C. 246, 6 Jones 245 (1858), is not convincing. Watson, supra, at 1038; 
(b) that Tushnet errs in arguing that rules ofliability adopted in a particular Georgia 
case, Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 137 (1853), could only have been justified by claims of 
humanity (rather than, as Watson argues, on grounds of appropriate rules of contract). 
Watson, supra, at 1040-42; 
(c) that Tushnet misreads Thomas Ruffin's opinion in the much-debated North Caro-
lina case, State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 229, 2 Dev. 263 (1829). Watson, supra, at 1042-44; and 
(d) that Tushnet's explanation for the fourth case in question, Jourdan v. Patton, 5 
Mart. 615 (La. 1818) also is erroneous: 
[T]his is nonsense on various levels. First, Tushnet has no right, without evidence or 
argument, to posit the theory on which the trial court based liability. In fact, Tushnet in 
this case is demonstrably wrong - the rule was simply taken from Spanish and French 
law, which in turn had taken it from Roman law. 
Watson, supra, at 1045. In all, for Watson, ''Tushnet's Marxist analysis reveals itself as funda-
mentally sterile." Id. at 1044. ''Tushnet's failure in his analysis of the cases ..• should mean 
that the book will convince only those predisposed to believe the theory," Id. at 1047. 
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of American law in general at a time of crisis in the American polity? 
This part lays the ground for examinins this question by considering 
other non-Marxist reactions to Tushnet's writing on constitutional 
issues and linking them with more general reactions to radical inter-
pretations in legal history and political science. It then further de-
velops the basis for inquiry by exploring Tushnet's broader, if 
shifting, program for a Marxist analysis of American Law. 
B. Non-Marxist Criticism of Tushnet on "Liberal" Constitutional 
Interpretation, or: Coming At Constitutional Debating 
Issues From the Extra-Paradigmatic North 
Writing three years ago in this Review, Tushnet (easily the most 
prolific of younger constitutional law scholars) expressed the wish 
that his critique of Professor Laurence Tribe ( easily the most cited of 
almost-as-young constitutional law scholars) be taken, not as coming 
from a particular point on the conventional left-right political spec-
trum, but rather from some unrelated direction, "say, the north." 182 
To a certain extent, Professor Tushnet got his wish. Judge Richard 
A. Posner took Tushnet's critique to be _coming from off-the-street 
and aiming several inches below the belt. Indeed, then-Professor 
Posner thought Tushnet's imputation of Tribe's motives in writing 
American Constitutional Law183 illustrative of a broader problem in 
recent legal scholarship coming from the "Critical Legal Studies" 
movement. 184 Said Posner in a recent Yale Law School Symposium 
on the state of legal education and scholarship: 
Some Marxists play by different rules from those of the other norma-
182. Tushnet, .Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 694 (1980) (reviewing L. TRIBE, AMERI· 
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)). 
183. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). Presumably, it was Tushnet's 
concluding paragraphs that most distressed Judge Posner: 
I hope that what has gone before raises a serious puzzle: how could so morally obtuse a 
work be taken so seriously? The answer can be found in Professor Tribe's ambition, 
which, like that of constitutional scholars generally, lies outside the world of scholarship 
and in the world of contemporary public affairs. Not that there is anything intrinsically 
wrong with ambition .... Most ofus have imagined ourselves as Justices of the Supreme 
Court, and Professor Tribe ... would surely be a better Justice than many. 
The question, though, is to what activities the rewards of ambition accrue. In . . . 
public affairs, they accrue not necessarily to intellectual substance. One who addresses the 
real questions of justice is by that fact alone disqualified • • • . I take some pleasure, not 
however unmixed with regret, in noting that the Framers would have understood the 
phenomenon that Professor Tribe's work represents: they called it corruption. 
Tushnet, supra note 182, at 710 (footnote omitted). 
184. For a recent discussion of the "Conference on Critical Legal Studies," which "at-
tempts to bring together scholars involved in radical legal studies and includes such notables as 
Duncan Kennedy, Morton Horwitz, Karl Klare, Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Unger," see 
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 
95 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1669 n.3 (1982); see also Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1983). 
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tive scholars, and rather ugly ones. I am thinking, for example, of 
Tushnet's recent unpardonable personal abuse of Laurence Tribe. The 
Marxist scholars question the objectivity and integrity of the non-
Marxists, whom they accuse of prostituting their intellectual abilities to 
personal or class interests. By this reasoning, the Marxists' motives 
should be equally suspect. Their emphasis on scholars' motives is, 
however, a distraction. Scholarship should be evaluated on its merits; 
it should not be disparaged by reference to the presumed motives of its 
practitioners.185 
Posner's reaction may not be exactly what Tushnet hoped for. 
The Siberian North was probably not the direction Tushnet intended 
to come from - although it is conceivable that he sought to exacer-
bate the internal contradictions of capitalist legal scholarship by rais-
ing its blood-pressure. Given my own diffidence about readily 
getting inside other people's minds, I cannot say. Yet two observa-
tions do seem fairly inferrable. The lesser is that Tushnet should 
deem discretion the better part of valor and stay out of Judge Pos-
ner's jurisdiction lest some ofTushnet's goods and baggage be seized 
and transferred to other persons valuing them more highly. 186 
The more important, and more serious, observation is that Pos-
ner's reaction itself exemplifies a recurrent problem in American le-
gal scholarship, indeed in American intellectual life generally. The 
problem is the difficulty that Marxists face in getting themselves 
taken seriously, or even read accurately. In the instant case, Posner 
seems to skip over both the substance of Tushnet's argument and the 
qualifying sentence preceding Tushnet's comments about Tribe's 
motivations. Although Tushnet's argument can be questioned, it is 
nonetheless seriously intended and novel. It is grounded in the gen-
eral contention that American Constitutional Law, like much else in 
contemporary constitutional scholarship, mistakes at its base the 
"central issue in political philosophy today."187 
Specifically, Tushnet contends thatAmerican Constitutional Law, 
having mistaken the central issue, (mis)organizes itself around four 
185. Posner, 'I7ze Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1127 (1981) 
(footnote omitted). 
186. See the discussion of the forcible taldng from Derek of a book he values at $2 and the 
giving of it to Amartya, who values it at $3, so as to increase the total societal wealth, in 
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL Snm. 191, 197-99 (1980), and Posner's reply in 
Posner, 'I7ze Value of Wealth: A Comment on .Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL Snm. 243, 
244-50 (1980). 
187. Tushnet, supra note 182, at 696. The central issue is, according to Tushnet, not what 
one would think "from reading law reviews, . • . whether abortion is morally permissible, • • • 
[or] whether remedial action that takes race explicitly into account is justified." Id. Rather, 
"the real one that has animated philosophical discussion • . • is which social-economic system, 
capitalism or socialism, justice demands. That is what John Rawls and Robert Nozick are 
concerned with .•.. " Id. 
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premises: (1) that the Constitution aims at securing justice; (2) that 
the Constitution "can fairly be interpreted to . . . approximate the 
accomplishment ofjustice";188 (3) that the Supreme Court should en-
gage in constitutional interpretation that promotes justice, the 
"premise . . . around which the standard controversies in constitu-
tional theory rage"; 189 and (4) (whence ''the fundamental contradic-
tions within the treatise emanate"190) that the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions, be they those of the late Warren Court or of the 
Burger Court, "are reasonable approximations of justice."191 I do 
not agree with much ofthis.192 Nonetheless, the driving moral intent 
behind Tushnet's critique seems clear. 
Tushnet's criticism proceeds, after all, regardless of its merits or 
lack thereof, from the moral judgment that there is something deeply 
wrong both with what gets onto the agenda of public law discussion 
and what is left off. His concern addresses what professors of law, 
that part of the nation's intellectual elite most influential in deter-
mining the perception of the law's role in shaping public needs, do 
and don't do. The mode of conducting the debates, the determina-
tion of what the "de rigeur" debate topics are (for example, whether 
"interpretivism" is, or is not, an intellectually viable approach to the 
constitutionality of statutes, 193 and whether a particular notorious 
188. Id. at 694. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 695. 
191. Id. 
192. Let me just note here two points of divergence - at the risk of being taken as an 
immoderate "originalist" and hence a constitutional fundamentalist of either the Protestant or 
Catholic legal persuasion. For discussions of "originalism" and "the civil religion of the con-
stitution," see Brest, The Miscon~eived Quest far the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 
204 (1980); Levinson, "The Constitution"inAmerican Civil Religion, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 123. I 
find it problematic that Tushnet's description of Tribe's first premise does not separate out two 
of its possible meanings. One is whether the single ( or even the main) aim of the Framers was 
"to secure justice" - which seems to me doubtful - or whether it was more centrally to 
improve the ex-Colonies' commercial conditions and capacity for external defense. The other 
matter of meaning is whether now, after nearly two centuries of amendment and interpreta-
tion, it is better to speak of a "glossed Constitution" as itself "aiming at justice" or whether it is 
more helpful to think in a less reifying fashion either of it as containing specific propositions 
that so "aim" or ofit or its particular propositions as something(s) that individuals (or groups, 
or classes) "aim" at justice in particular (sets of) circumstances. 
Putting aside the question of whether these four premises all in fact best describe the un-
derpinnings of Professor Tribe's organizational modes and analytic objectives, I should have 
thought that more of the current "standard controversies in constitutional theory rage," if they 
rage at all, around the content of the fourth premise (whether recent Supreme Court decisions 
approximate justice), than around the content of the third (whether the Court should aim at 
accomplishing justice). Even Justice Rehnquist rarely argues for a contrary aim. 
193. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); J. 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Brest, supra note 192; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpre-
tation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental 
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Grey, .Do We Have an 
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case - be it Kras, 194 Bellotti, 195 National League of Cities, 196 or Roe 
v. Wade 197 - can be squared with justice), and, ultimately, how 
much justice and how much injustice will be done are all to an im-
portant extent prima facie "responsibilities" of that elite. If one 
starts from that position, as does Tushnet, it is much less gratuitously 
insulting than ethically and analytically necessary to ask why a 
scholar building so enormous an intellectual edifice as Tribe's trea-
tise (mis)constructs it as he does. In turn, an inquiry into motiva-
tions and, if the inquiry calls for it, an adverse judgment concerning 
those motivations flow quite naturally from Tushnet's normative 
starting point. He is simply instancing a particular "trahison des 
clercs"198 - in this case the ''treason" of a once-clerk and, Tushnet 
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Kurland, Curia Regis, Some Comments 
on the .Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To Say What the Law Is", 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 581 
(1981); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, 
Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1979); Parker, The Past of Consti-
tutional Theory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of 
Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 261 (1981); Laycock, Taking Constitullons 
Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 True. L. REv. 343 (1981); Levinson, 
Judicial Review and the Problem of the Comprehensible Constitution (Book Review), 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 395 (1981). 
194. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (sustaining the constitutionality of a law 
requiring payment of a $50 filing fee, spreadable over a maximum of nine months, as a condi-
tion precedent to obtaining bankruptcy discharge). This case is notorious as far as Tushnet 
and the four dissenters, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, are concerned. See 
Tushnet, '! .. And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice" - Some Notes on the Supreme Court, 
1972 Tenn, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 177, 184-85 (discussing the Term during which Tushnet was 
one of Justice Marshall's clerks and Kras was handed down). For other critical co=entary 
on Kras, see L. TRIBE, supra note 183, at 1009, 1120-22; Binion, The .Disadvantaged Before the 
_ Burger Court: The Newest Unequal Protection, 4 LAW & POL. Q. 37, 44-47 (1982); Clune, The 
Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth .Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 
SUP. CT. REv. 289, 314-15. 
195. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down, as violative of first 
and fourteenth amendment free speech rights, a Massachusetts statute limiting corporations' 
expenditures for expressing company views concerning upcoming referenda proposals that did 
not materially affect its business interests). 
196. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating the 1974 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending maximum hours and minimum wage provi-
sions to state, county, and municipal employees). Tushnet characterizes Tribe's sympathetic 
treatment of the majority position, see L. TRIBE, supra note 183, at 308-18, as "tendentious," 
and the majority position itself as one "that reeks of the American Enterprise Institute." 
Tushnet, supra note 182, at 698. 
197. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Tushnet, at least as to outcome, would not consider that case 
"notorious." But see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!ft A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
LJ. 920 (1973); J. ELY, supra note 193, at 248 n.52 (updating of Ely's view on the issue); see 
also Epstein, Substantive .Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. 
REV. 159. 
198. See 1. BENDA, LA TRAHISON DES CLERCS (1927). Benda's objection to many intellec-
tuals of his generation was to be sure a bit different as to what they betrayed: 
About 1890, the men of letters, especially in France and Italy, realized with astonishing 
astuteness that the doctrines of arbitrary authority ... contempt for the spirit of liberty, 
assertion of the morality of war . . . were . . . poses infiniteli more likely to strike the 
imagination of simple souls than . . . Liberalism and Humanitarianism. 
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thinks, would-be future king ( or at least judicial employer) of clerks. 
On this view of the matter, Posner's reprimand for "un-bour-
geois" intellectual manners misses the point. There are two points 
really. One is that it does not accomplish much for us bourgeois, 
who are thereby made uncomfortable, simply to enjoin those who 
are deliberately rejecting "bourgeois niceties." The other is that we 
may be better off being less dismissive and more enquiring into the 
sources of the objectionable behavior. We might learn something 
unpleasant but useful. 
Before leaving Posner's reprimand, we need to note two further 
costs of such a peremptory dismissal. First, note how casually it 
leaps from ruling beyond the pale ''some Marxists" who play by ugly 
rules (and note how "some" at first equals one, Tushnet) to all Marx-
ists: "The Marxist scholars question the objectivity and integrity of 
the non-Marxists .... By this reasoning, the Marxists' motives 
should be equally suspect."199 This non sequitur is as sloppy as any-
thing I have seen Tushnet pen in a rush. 
Second, but more important, the phrase "by this reasoning" mis-
understands the Marxist position on three counts. One, it is no sur-
prise that Marxist scholars question (whether politely or rudely) the 
objectivity of non-Marxist scholars. Marxism "expects" non-Marxist 
scholars to wear ideological blinders, and in this case they are argua-
bly right. But, two, it does not follow from "this reasoning" that the 
Marxists' motives should be equally suspect because, of course (and 
this is the very devil ofit from our non-Marxist viewpoint), Marxism 
argues that "its" scholars transcend ideologically induced mispercep-
tion and achieve objectivity. Three, in arguing that "emphasis on 
scholars' motives is a distraction" and that scholarship should "not 
be disparaged by reference to . . . presumed motives" but rather 
"evaluated on its merits,"200 Posner adopts by fiat precisely the 
bourgeois interpretive canons that Marxist analysis rejects. Interest-
ingly, given recent articles in law reviews and political science jour-
nals urging the applicability to constitutional interpretation of 
hermeneutics and post-structuralist methods of literary interpreta-
tion,201 these canons have lately been much questioned in ancillary 
J. BENDA, BETRAYAL OF THE INTELLECTUALS 135 (R. Aldington trans. 1955). 
199. Posner, supra note 185, at 1127 (emphasis added). 
200. Posner's position respecting legal scholarship curiously approximates that of the New 
Critical School of the 1940s in American literary criticism. 
201. See Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676 
(1979) (discussing statutory interpretation, but also applicable to constitutional interpretation); 
Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982); Deutsch, Law As Metaphor: A 
Structural Analysis of the Legal Process, 66 GEO. L.J. 1339 (1978); Harris, Bonding Word and 
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interpretive disciplines by non-Marxists.202 Posner's fiat, in short, 
makes us - if we accept it - adopt blinders that prevent us from 
learning much beyond good etiquette. They exemplify a cross-epis-
temological and cross-ontological problem of divergent analytic ap-
proaches more than they solve it. 
I have belabored Posner's comments a bit both because I think 
they may resemble the reactions of many constitutional scholars 
when confronted with Marxist legal analysis and because they have 
symptomatic counterparts in reactions to "radical analysis" arising 
in two domains of inquiry relatively proximate to constitutional 
scholarship - legal history and political science. I shall give just 
one example pertaining to each. 
The first comes from American legal history. I have in mind 
Boundaries of Realism,203 Professor Peter Teachout's lengthy review 
of G. Edward White's Tort Law in America .204 Boundaries is almost 
as much an attack upon what he calls " 'the new orthodoxy' in 
American legal historical thought"205 as it is a panegyric on White's 
book. Interesting as much of Boundaries' analysis is, it displays a 
strong reactive pattern. Thus: 
In recent years, the world of American legal historiography has be-
Polity: The Logic of American Conslitutionalism, 16 AM. POI,. Sci. REV. 34 (1982). For criti-
cisms of this attempt to apply "deconstruction," see Kurland, supra note 193; Fiss, supra note 
193. 
202. Useful discussions of the structuralist and post-structuralist trends in literary interpre-
tation and related interpretation in the humanities and anthropology include: T. HAWKES, 
STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS (1977); F. JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A 
CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM (1972); E. KURZWEIL, 
THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM: LEVI-STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT (1980) (especially the essays 
therein entitled Hermeneutics and Structuralism and Literary Structuralism and Erotics); P. 
PETTIT, THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1975); see also H. 
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge ed. 1976). 
I find it hard to resist concluding that most of the legal scholars' and political scientists' 
"importing" of structuralist, post-structuralist, and particularly deconstructionist analytic 
modes into constitutional interpretation look more like capitalizations on those imports' capac-
ity to bedazzle in aid of constitutional noninterpretivism than like genuine analytic advances. 
Conspicuously absent so far is any serious reckoning with discussions of the shortcomings of 
such analytic modes in the disciplines where they originated. Among the critiques of decon-
struction in literary analysis, see DONAGHUE, Deconstructing Deconstruction: Review of Harold 
JJ/oom, Paul de Man, Jacques Dellida, and J. Hillis Miller, Deconstruction and Criticism, N.Y. 
REv. BooKS, June 12, 1980, at 37 (de Man comes in for particularly strong criticism); Graff, 
Fear and Trembling al Yale, 46 AM. SCHOLAR 467 (1977) (attacking Yale English faculty, 
leaders of American post-structuralist movement, for advancing a "no-fault" theory of inter-
pretation); Kenner, Decoding Roland JJarthes, 261 HARPER's 68 (Aug., 1980). The reader who 
shares the concern of Fiss, see Fiss, supra note 193, with where deconstruction might lead in 
constitutional interpretation might profitably examine H. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VES-
SELS (1982). 
203. Teachout, Boundaries of Realism, 61 VA. L. REv. 815 (1981). 
204. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980). 
205. Teachout, supra note 203, at 819. 
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come deeply divided over the question of how the basic patterns of 
American legal historical experience ought to be viewed. During the 
seventies there emerged a "new school" of American legal historians 
who reject what they call "the conservative tradition" in American le-
gal historiography and advance in its place an alternative historiogra-
phy centered in and structured by ideological theory. Because of its 
doctrinaire character, this new historiography has come to be regarded 
as "the new orthodoxy" in American legal historical thought. 
The central thrust of the new historiography is its attack upon . . . 
classic liberalism. According to the new orthodoxy, a culture based on 
liberal premises is destructively competitive, individualistic, and legal-
istic. The primary task of the new historian, accordingly, is to write 
revisionist history that "demonstrates" the corrupting and disintegrat-
ing tendencies of liberalism. Professor Horwitz's recent Tran.iformation 
of American Law, for example, can be read as an attempt to demon-
strate how . . . a world of simple communal justice was transformed 
into one dominated by legalism, manipulation, and greed. Against this 
unhappy picture of liberalism and its consequences, the new orthodoxy 
holds out an alternative vision of society based on "communitarian" 
principles.206 
In my judgment, this description of the state of affairs in current 
American legal history contains three major flaws. 
First, unless I utterly misapprehend the distribution of political 
philosophy and analytic proclivity among the more research-active 
members of that learned field (going, for example, by the tenor of 
papers, commentaries, and questions at the annual meetings of the 
American Society for Legal History), at most a tiny minority of those 
members write or speak as though they think their central objective 
is attacking classical liberalism or demonstrating its corrupting and 
disintegrating tendencies. Nor do many appear to me to be ideo-
logues believing in a bygone world of simple communal justice or 
even thinking about alternative visions of future society based on 
"communitarian" principles. Far more than being deeply "anti-
law," a charge Teachout elsewhere ampli:fies,207 the great majority of 
206. Id. at 819-20 (footnotes omitted). 
207. See Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Problem of "Respect far the Rule of Law" in Ameri-
can Legal History, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 241, 244-47, 272-78 (1978). Presser, Legal Histo,y or 
Histo,y of the Law, 35 V AND. L. REv. 849, 857-68 (1982), offers another way of dividing up 
recent American legal historical_ scholarship, into four discernible schools: (1) conservative, 
adopting ''the notion that law has followed an orderly evolution according to fixed intellectual 
principles," id. at 857; (2) ''the Wisconsin School," viewing "economic needs as the primary 
determinants of law," id. at 858; (3) the "radical transformation school," also economically 
focused but "reject[ing] some of the relatively benign implications of the Wisconsin school's 
historiography," id. at 859; and (4) a "heroic school" which "can be likened to Elizabethan 
tragedy or Greek mythology because it focuses on great men of the law," id. at 863. Presser's 
divisions have the advantage of being less "alarmist" than Teachout's perceptions. But I think 
they are too simple, leaving out a considerable amount of legal historical scholarship that 
doesn't pigeonhole so readily, finding substantial schools where at most there may be enough 
scholars to form a transitory one-room schoolhouse, and putting certain scholars where they 
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legal historians strikes me as eminently enamored of law - espe-
cially its most antiquarian obscurities. Indeed, Professor Teachout's 
list of radicals is barely enough for a "teach-in": "The leading repre-
sentative of the new school is Professor Morton Horwitz of Harvard 
Law School."208 Teachout finds that Horwitz's themes are also ex-
pressed by Nelson, Unger, Levinson, and Tushnet.209 That's five. 
Given my lack of conviction that Sanford Levinson and Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger are primarily legal historians, I am constrained 
to think that the "new orthodoxy'' has come to be regarded as such 
mainly in Professor Teachout's head. I suspect that the Church of 
England has at least as good a chance of being reestablished in Vir-
ginia as Teachout's neo-orthodoxy has of coming to be so regarded 
generally among American legal historians. 
A second major defect in Teachout's description of the state of 
affairs in American legal history is that the members of this none-
too-numerous band of "neo's" disagree among themselves. The 
third and most important defect in Teachout's position is that it 
reaches, albeit via a different route, an intellectual station-stop un-
comfortably like that of Judge Posner. It wants to get those "coming 
from the North" off the train in one lumpy group, and to send the 
"neo-orthodox" pa9king back up North. Quite apart from the cir-
cumstance that so doing reminds me uncomfortably of the antebel-
lum Southern solution for dealing with visiting abolitionist 
dignitaries, I would like to hear more precisely what each of these 
"neo-orthodox" scholars has to say, and why. 
Having said this much, I shall relegate most of the political sci-
ence example to the footnotes and to another occasion, pausing only 
to declare that roughly a decade and a half ago there erupted in 
political science a normative cry against the dominant pluralist 
description of the distribution of American political power. I have 
in mind the "non-decisionmaking" critique of American plural-
ism.210 Succinctly put, that critique argued that a prime characteris-
don't really fit Robert Covers Justice Accused (1975) and Grant Gilmore's Tlte Ages of Ameri-
can Law (1977) don't really measure up to Elizabethan tragedy or Greek mythology; nor do I 
think Cover is so simplistic as to view Lemuel Shaw and his legal decisions as wholly in-
dependent "of the economics of his time or • • . a particular legal tradition . . . ." Presser, 
supra at 863. Pressers approval ofTeachout's judgment that ''the writers in this school are not 
really generating historical scholarship ... [but] producing literature," id. at 864, is a bit un-
kind both to these legal historians and to writers of literature. 
208. Teachout, supra note 203, at 819 n.17. 
209. Id. 
210. See Bachrach & Baratz, Jwo Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947 (1962); Bach-
rach & Baratz, Power and its Jwo Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geqffrey .Debnam, 69 AM. POL. 
SCI. R.Ev. 900 (1975); see also Bachrach & Baratz, .Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical 
Framework, 57 AM. POL. SCI. R.Ev. 632 (1963). 
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tic of American politics was a pattern of elites keeping really 
pressing problems inherent in post-industrial American democracy 
off the political agenda by controlling what was, and what was not, 
"legitimate" to raise in government fora. 
Without declaring my position on the "non-decisionmaking de-
bate," I think it pertinent to stress one similarity and one difference_ 
in the treatment that political science accorded its ''visitation from 
the North" and the treatment that the law's method of analysis has 
accorded similar visitations. The similarity is that both approaches 
were rejected by the dominant school of analysis.211 The difference 
is that in political science, the "dissident tendency'' got its "day in 
court," including a detailed assessment and rebuttal. Succinctly put, 
the "non-decisionmaking" critique was "sent packing up North" by 
the intellectually respectable technique of arguing its methodological 
deficiencies.212 But in constitutional law and, to a lesser extent, m 
legal history, the "dissident tendency'' has so far been -more often 
met with "open pages for expression" than with painstaking 
assessment. 
The remainder of this Article is devoted to such an assessment. 
Such an undertaking is required not only by the "civil obligation" of 
giving a response, but also by the very uncertainties about the pur-
poses and effectiveness of legal research and teaching recently ex-
pressed by such "establishment" representatives as Harvard 
University President Derek Bok, as well as others who~ along with 
Posner, were heard at the Yale Law School Symposium.213 The 
211. If we go by the content of articles in major political science journals, the nondeci-
sionmaking critique had been quashed by the mid-70s. 
212. See, e.g., Wolfinger, Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics, 65 AM. POL. ScI. 
REv. 1063 (1971); Frey, Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power, 65 AM. POL. 
SCI. REv. 1081 (1971); Wolfinger, Rejoinder to Frey's "Comment", 65 AM. POL. SCI. R.Ev. 1102 
(1971); see also Debnam, Nondecisions and Power: The 1wo Faces of Bachrach and Baratz, 69 
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 889 (1975); Debnam, Rejoinder to "Comment" by Peter Bachrach and Mor-
ton S. Baratz, 69 AM. PoL. ScI. REv. 905 (1975). 
213. Bok's 1981-1982 Report to the Harvard Overseers dealt with problems oflegal educa-
tion at Harvard in the 1980s. See Bok, A Flawed System, 85 HARV. MAo. 38 (1983). For 
further discussion of these problems, see Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 
1149, 1149 (1981) (''My thesis is that law scholarship •.• is fragmented and drifting." Stone 
argues that research into law as !anguage would give law a clearer sense of purpose.); see also 
Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE LJ. 1007, 1007, 1016 (1981) ("Positivism is an idea 
that has generated a great deal of confusion • . • • Stumped, especially by these papers, Pro-
fessor Robert Gordon announced that he had 'come to the conclusion that a positivist is some-
one who sounds very positive.' ") (''The law, as opposed to history, is lacking a literature on its 
scholarship .•.• The hour is late ••.• "); Fletcher, 1wo Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE 
LJ. 970, 970 (1981) (''We have no jurisprudence oflegal scholarship •••. Yet we reflect little 
about what we are doing when we write about the law."); Michelman, Politics As Medicine: On 
Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1224, 1124 (1981) ("Here it is, Sunday morn-
ing. Something • . • makes me think it must be my role to counter Mark Tushnet's message of 
despair with the message of hope-and to wrestle with Alan Freeman for the soul of Paul 
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need is also suggested by the differences in the contemporary states 
of two "law-and" areas of inquiry - "law-and-history" (robust and 
expansive) and "law-and-political science" (much less robust, even 
in the doldrums between normative analysis and the search for that 
in the law which is both distinctively political and readily quantifi-
able ).214 More broadly, this assessment is called for by the condi-
tions of the larger American polity - especially the stasis or 
retrogression of social and economic goods distribution characteriz-
ing the past few years, the Democratic opposition's extraordinary in-
ability to mount a coherent critique of this stasis or retrogression, 
and the Administration's seeming inability to do more in foreign re-
lations than to separate the country further from Western Europe 
Brest. The problem posed to us by Professor Tushnet is the failure of contemporary legal 
scholarship, as he sees it, to participate significantly in what he takes to be the one true intellec• 
tual calling of our times . . . ."); Shapiro, On The Regrettable Decline of Law French: Or 
Shapiro Jellet Le Brickbat, 90 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198 (1981) ("Professor Stone's call ••• may 
well be the first trumpet call of an essentially reactionary movement ..•. "). 
214. Defending fully the proposition that law-and-political-science is in the doldrums 
would require an essay in itself. That is not possible here. Certain phenomena evident at the 
1982 American Political Science Association and the 1983 Western Political Science Associa-
tion annual meetings, however, might be considered at least indicative. Each meeting featured 
panel discussions that revolved around questions such as "Where are we going now?" and 
"Are we really scientists of the law's processes?" Those discussions also betrayed unease as to 
how political scientists specializing in law could become more central to the "discipline" of 
political science - that is, less peripheral compared to, for example, students of voting or of 
legislative processes. Arguably, the public law speciality in political science continues to suffer 
to a peculiar degree from identity-anxiety and a perceived failure to attain the "science status" 
sought by some. Be that as it may, it is interesting that only one of the panelists at the 
W.P.S.A. meeting continued to speak in the optimistic behavioral terms common in the 1960s. 
J!_js also indicative that, after a generation of seeking independence, the references to discus-
sion-relevant articles in the five W.P.S.A. papers came by a ratio of about three-to-one from 
law reviews rather than political science journals. See Whither Political Jurisprudence?, W. 
PoL. Q. (forthcoming, Dec. 1983) (collecting the W.P.S.A. papers as a symposium). 
The A.P.S.A. convention papers showed sufficient diversity on the subject of public law's 
methodological paradigm to establish one "negative pregnant" - that if such a paradigm is 
one necessary condition of a scientific speciality, public law just is not in the ballpark. Com-
pare L. Carter, Models of Public Law Scholarship and Their Payoffs (Sept. 2-5, 1982) (unpub-
lished paper delivered at A.P.S.A. annual meeting), with C. Tate, The Development of the 
Methodology of Judicial Behavior Research: A Historical Review and Critique of the Use and 
Teaching of Methods (Sept. 2-5, 1982) (unpublished paper delivered at A.P,S.A. annual meet-
ing). Carter maintains that "[o]f the several current political science uses of the label 'public 
law,' the most inclusive (and the one most frequently used) refers to no coherent theory or 
body of knowledge about either law or the public." L. Carter, supra at 3. Generally, his essay 
takes a line somewhat analogous to that of Stone, arguing for a "new public law" concerned 
with "how language shapes and limits the perception of normative issues .•• ," Id. at 11. 
Tate, on the other hand, is still very positive about positivist science's possibilities. Method-
ological deficiencies, rather than something amiss in the scientific undertaking itself, explain 
for Tate the sub-optimal progress of political-science-in-law. See also, B.C. Canon, Studying 
the Impact of Judicial Decisions: A Period of Stagnation and Prospects for the Future; D.M. 
Provine, Research on the Judicial Process, 1970-82: What Have We Learned?; A. Villmoare, 
What Is the Conceptual Future of the Analysis of Public Law? One Perspective on the Ques-
tions (all presented at the A.P.S.A. meeting; Canon the most critical as to disciplinary progress, 
Villmoare "fishing" for useful approaches from other disciplines' methodologies and conceptu-
alizations, Provine less pessimistic but well short of positive positivism). 
November 1983) Radical Inte,pretations 327 
and to re-stage the Vietnamese peasant-shooting enterprise in Cen-
tral America. All of these factors argue for a "critical liberal" exami-
nation of the insights, if any, that the "Critical Legal Studies 
Movement" offers in examining the role of law in shaping, or mis-
shaping, the American polity's destiny and the life-situations of its 
members. 
So, deferring for now whether we would be better advised "to 
call on God to speak."215 or to "find the mind's opportunity in the 
heart's revenge," rather than standing "in tedious embarrassment 
before cold altars,"216 let us play with fire a bit. 
C. Marxist Language as a Barrier to Understanding, and Tushnet's 
Maximum and Minimum Goals for a Marxist Theory of 
American Law 
Of course, Tushnet is not really coming at us from the (non-Sibe-
rian) North. That was a red herring. But neither is he quite coming 
at us from the People's Cossack-dancing revels in the birch forests 
around Moscow or from the Central European tradition of Dracula-
like pointy-headed Marxist intellectuals out to sap the vitality of the 
monopoly-capitalist Western European and North American bodies 
politic.217 
Any American intellectual who is seriously committed to socio-
economic reform and who organizes his critique of American folk-
and corporate-ways around a Marxist framework of analysis runs 
great risks. I do not mean, however, to doubt that one can critique 
American trends with impunity or even reward. One can. There are 
indeed at least eight safe ways within the domain of American legal 
scholarship to critique American ways. Starting with the most spa-
cious, one may pen a philosophical treatise at a level of abstraction 
that avoids having clearly to resolve whether its distributive judg-
ments are compatible with socialism or capitalism.218 Second, one 
may pen constitutional treatises that make straight ( or at least show 
215. After showing conclusively, at least in the eyes ofTushnet, the pitfalls of liberalism, 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger concludes Knowledge and Politics with the words (he likes quasi-
literary, post-analytic flourishes): "Desirous of faitµ, touched by hope, and moved by love, 
men look unceasingly for God. . . . But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. 
Why then do you remain silent? Speak, God." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 295 
(1975). 
216. Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HAR.v. L. REv. 561, 675 (1983) (where Un-
ger gets meta-analytic again). 
217. Note that I do not say "bodies economic." Clearly he would like to change substan-
tially at least the distribution of economic goods. 
218. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); J. RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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the way to making more straight) the Supreme Court's way through 
the political wildemess.219 This approach usually avoids altogether 
the question of whether its distributive prescriptions are compatible 
with socialism or capitalism. 
The third safe method is to compose historical treatises that 
plainly disapprove of some past American evil and that contain 
vaguely well-intentioned implications for current American justice 
and justices;220 this approach also avoids questions of compatibility. 
Alternatively, there is a fourth approach: writing casebooks that 
seek to rectify judicially wrought (or aided) wrongs by, variously, 
locating the source of primal error in some unfortunate formalist law 
professor who, long deceased, cannot defend his failure to bring 
about legal coherence or social justice;221 anticipating improvement 
in solving a core problem of scarce resources by increasing judicial 
limitation of state power in favor of national power;222 or imbuing 
the student simultaneously with the complexity of constitutional 
questions and the desirability of measured legal-doctrinal change as 
the way to bring about social, economic, and political progress.223 
Fifth, one can "critique" by documenting alarming changes in 
the ''who owns what" of the American economy, or "who damages 
what" of American nature, and suggesting "cures" that no political 
majority is likely to take seriously. A sixth option is to write articles 
demonstrating that, while not everything is improving, at least the 
Court's handling of a particular invidious distinction may be. Sev-
enth, the critic can write articles that support affirmative action, or 
eighth, produce articles showing that the Burger Court has reached a 
sensible middle-of-the-road disposition of one or more problems of 
late-industrial capitalism, such as the terms under which middle-
class public employees work or are fired.224 
219. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981); L. TRIBE, supra note 183; see also Easterbook, Ways 
of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982) (useful analysis of ways in which, given 
that the Supreme Court consists of nine persons who often disagree with each other in their 
value priorities, it is and is not sensible to criticize the Court). 
220. See, e.g., R. COVER, JUSTICE AccusED (1975). Justice Accused has become a bit the 
"darling" of law professors skimming the law of slavery topic (somewhat less so of legal his-
torians burrowing into it). For a rare adverse judgment by a lawyer, see Tushnet, Book Re• 
view, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HJsT. 168 (1976). 
221. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,supra note 32, at 6 (Joseph Beale takes it on 
the chin for having tried to solve conflict-of-laws problems by ''territorializing" them). 
222. See, e.g., G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL Puauc LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAW (1981). 
223. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 
1980). 
224. See Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A .Defense of Roth and Perry, 
71 CALIF. L. REv. 146, 192 (1983). 
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Why should Professor Tushnet find the breadth of all this critical 
room insufficient? Why should a Marxist critique be necessary for 
him? After all, if none of these methods is sufficient, he could busy 
himself with what at least one legal scholar takes to be the central 
problem of contemporary constitutional scholarship - the adequa-
cies and inadequacies of "interpretivist" versus "non-interpretivist" 
approaches to constitutional decision making.225 Why won't this do? 
The answers to these questions are important - if (though not) only 
because of Tushnet's analytic uniqueness among Marxist Anglo-
American legal scholars. 
A common characteristic divides these scholars from Tushnet. 
The characteristic is that they take Marxist analysis very seriously in 
an "interpretivist sense." Either they do so in a fundamentalist fash-
ion, and quite illiterately,226 or they do so in a less fundamentalist-
and more literate - manner. In this the members of the more liter-
ate sub-group have much in common with the best Marxist histori-
ans, such as Eugene Genovese, who, whatever else they may be, are 
neither fundamentalist nor lacking in linguistic felicity, but who 
think that the "source" is interpretively crucial to an adequate analy-
sis. For Tushnet, the role of Marx/Engels "scripture" is much less 
clear, as is the appropriate maximum goal of a Marxist analysis of 
American law. Tushnet, in other words, waffles on whether a power-
ful Marxist analysis of law is really possible. In an odd sense, that is 
why his analysis ought to be taken seriously and ought to be care-
fully scrutinized. What makes the examination of Tushnet's work 
interesting is, in large measure, his oscillation among three positions 
- whether Marxism is capable of a "strong" analysis of American 
law ( one covering both the specific and the general characteristics of 
that law), or whether it can only hope to attain a ''weak" analysis 
( one embracing general trends but having little or nothing to say 
about particular cases or doctrinal devolutions), or whether, yet 
more weakly, Marxism is merely useful as an existential "anti-" posi-
tion ( one more valuable for affirming differences from "establish-
ment" analyses than for describing general or specific propositions 
about the path of American law). 
In addition, Tushnet exhibits at least three Marxist faces whose 
alternating appearances in various essays make Tushnet's overall po-
225. See Brest, supra note 192; Brest, supra note 201; see also Brest, The Fundamental 
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nonnative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 
YALE LJ. 1063 (1981) (arguing that both interpretivism and non-interpretivism are ultimately 
failures). 
226. See, e.g., Hunt, Dichotomy and Contradiction in the Sociology of Law, 8 BRIT. J. LAW 
& SoCY. 47 (1981). 
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sition difficult to grasp.227 The first "face" is concerned chiefly with 
assessing, at a fairly high level of abstraction, the value and limita-
tions of Marxist analysis of American law.228 The second "face" is 
concerned primarily with using Marxist analysis to critique both 
conventional liberal American legal scholarship in general and par-
ticular issues that such conventional scholarship prominently dis-
cusses, such as "Structural Constitutional Review" and 
''Interpretivism versus Non-Interpretivism."229 The third "face" is 
the "legal historical" one. It is concerned both with applying Marx-
ist analysis to nineteenth century American law and with criticizing 
the shortcomings of conventional liberal and non-Marxist radical es-
says on that subject. 
Beyond the confused situation in which the scattering of 
Tushnet's analyses across so many essays leaves his readers, there 
are at least four main barriers to speedy overall assessment. One is 
contained in what, from the American liberal standpoint, appear as 
the linguistic peculiarities of Marxist writing - especially the use of 
certain recurrent "evidence-summing" metaphors with pejorative 
connotations. 
The second barrier springs from the fact that Tushnet's views as 
to how much specificity and explanatory power can be displayed by 
Marxist analysis of American law have shifted over time. The third 
barrier, which is most apparent in his "second face" analyses of post-
Realist legal scholarship, is that those analyses merge critical axioms 
flowing from Legal Realism and from Marxism variously in a some-
times opaque fashion. 
227. That is to say nothing of those of his articles that are entirely or almost entirely con-
ventional case or doctrinal discussions. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Sociology of Article Ill: A 
Response lo Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1698 (1980); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 1919 WIS. L. REv. 125; Tushnet, Conslilulional and Statutory Analyses 
in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1301 (1978); Tushnet, Conslilulional Limi-
tation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 
B.U. L. REv. 775 (1975). 
228. This face is manifested chiefly in five essays published or written since 1978. See 
Tushnet,A Marxist Analysis of Amencan Law, in MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES]; Tushnet, Book Review, 7 BRIT, J. L. & 
SoCY. 122 (1980) (reviewing M. CAIN & A. HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979), P. 
HlRsT, ON LAW AND IDEOLOGY (1979), and C. SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES (1979)) [here-
inafter cited as Tushnet, BRITJSH REVIEW]; M. Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor (unpublished 
paper, forthcoming in 1983) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, 1983 Marxism as Metaphor]; M. 
Tushnet, Marxism and Law (unpublished paper, forthcoming in 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Tushnet, 1983 Marxism and Law); M. Tushnet, Is There A Marxist Theory of Law? (Sept. 2-6, 
1981) (paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal 
Philosophy) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory]. 
229. See Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law 
Scholarship in the Seventies, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1979). This article also contains a discus-
sion of what a Marxist theory of law ought to be about. See id. at 1346-58. 
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The fourth barrier is something of an "evidentiary analogue" to 
the third, but it arises in the area of nineteenth century American 
legal history. Part of the problem is suggested by recalling Alan 
Watson's argument that some of the peculiarities of Southern slave 
law could be explained in terms of the natural legal evolution of any 
slave society and thus were understandable without recourse to what 
he took to be Marxism's not very insightful insights into the antebel-
lum South. More broadly, the problem relates to an observation by 
Frederic Jameson quoted near the outset of this Article. Does, to 
state it somewhat differently, Marxist dialectic's focus upon the his-
toriographic equivalent of twentieth century physics' ''wave theory'' 
explanations of ''light" merely amount to a vaguer ·and more cum-
brous mode of explanation of history than Anglo-American empiri-
cal history's focus upon (to continue the analogy) a "particle theory'' 
of historical individuals' activities? Or are Marxism's different in-
sights somehow ''worthwhile"? Lastly, in this connection, are the 
"canons of sufficient evidence" properly thought to be the same 
when judging between the two historiographical approaches: does 
Ockham's razor properly apply to both?230 In the remainder of this 
Part we shall consider the first two of these four barriers.231 
I wish to deal with the first of these difficulties - Marxism's lin-
guistic peculiarities - in a two-step fashion. First, we must bring to 
the surface our (bourgeois) sense of objection to some common 
Marxist terms by simply lining them up. The second step is to see 
whether we can profitably "de-fang" them with whimsy yet leave 
them with some explanatory value by turning them into non-Marxist 
or "less Marxist" phrases with sense-meanings apprehendable from 
a liberal perspective. 
I choose selectively from a long list of potentially "annoying" 
Marxist words and phrases by limiting the examples to a small sam-
ple drawn mainly from Tushnet's writings and from three other re-
cent Marxist essays on law.232 Here is a short list, with "de-fanged" 
substitutes: 
230. Another radical legal historian puts the point well: 
One cannot repeat too often that Marx's dialectical approach involves the rejection of a 
familiar bourgeois way of looking at the world in favor of the development of a more 
comprehensive, qualitative, substantive approach which, among other things, disavows 
the liberal fact/value distinction and the liberal mode of definition-by-isolation. 
Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 663, 701 n.133 (1982). 
231. The other two require a separate essay in themselves. 
232. Abel,A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J. LAW & SocY. 199 (1981); Balbus, 
Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW 
& Socr. REv. 571 (1977); Hunt, supra note 226. 
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"Socialist camp," "imperialist camp," "death agony of capitalism. " 
The first two are annoying to some of us who associate "camp" 
fondly with childhood summers but who don't want to be thought of 
as having nothing better than army cots to sleep in the rest of the 
year. "Death agoni' seems a bit overdrawn; possibly capitalism is 
better than Italian opera stars at lengthy death scenes. Let's say 
"Marxist-Leninist countries/' "democratic-pluralist countries," and 
"bad day on Wall Street." 
"Ruthless imperialist beast," jackal legal henchmen," and 'paper 
tiger." Let's say "that nice David Rockefeller," ''the distinguished 
law-and-economics professors," and ''papier mache pussycat." 
So much for the general nouns and noun-phrases of Marxist 
name-calling. What about verbs? 
"Emanate," "mystify," "generate," "he implicated in," ''exploit," 
"oppress. " The first three only suggest confusion, while the last 
three imply guilt. It is, oddly perhaps, easier to defang the latter trio 
- respectively, "be functionally related to," "give foreign aid to as-
sist in the economic development of," and "anti-inflationary wage-
restraining." The first three verbs are typical analytic conjunctures 
linking fairly reified abstract nouns and noun phrases - for exam-
ple, "Capitalism generates liberal ideology." We will have to defang 
them as they come along individually. What of Marxist legal analy-
sis terms-of-art? 
"Legal fetishism," jetishism of commodities." These are particu-
larly irritating, but more for Freudian than Marxian reasons. After 
all, Karl preceded Sigmund. "Characterized by greater concern with 
the rule of law than with socioeconomic inequalities," and "being 
more concerned with 'keeping up with the Joneses' than with the 
human costs of work-conditions," will have to do as restatements. 
"Internal contradictions of liberal law," ''economic infrastructure 
versus legal superstructure," ''hegemony of liberal legal ideology," ''di-
lemmas of liberal-capitalist legal theory," and jormal legal reflections 
of ruling class interests." These are all particularly irritating to law-
yers and legal scholars. Metaphoric animal names may not break 
bones. Indeed, they're a bit funny - though Marxist-Leninists intel-
lectuals, who almost uniformly seem to be below the tenth percentile 
in capacity for humor, often do not realize this. But these phrases all 
go straight to our sense of intellectual independence. They put us in 
a kind of Platonic cave of legal analysis, implying that we labor long 
and hard with mere legal shadows of what really matters intellectu-
ally. The implication that we do not know that dilemmas and con-
tradictions suffuse even our most hard-headed thinking is also 
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disconcerting. Moreover, they defy general defanging. Again we 
shall have to take them up as we come to them. _ 
If it is important in understanding contemporary American 
Marxist analysis of law not to be put off at the start by some of the 
general phraseology I have just lampooned, it is very important to 
realize that as that analysis emerged during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, its more sophisticated practitioners, including Tushnet, put 
considerable distance between their view of the relationships of law 
and economy, on the one hand, and a simple determinist view of 
those relationships, on the other. Thus, to offer an illustration 
"outside of" Tushnet, Balbus has outlined the essentials of his own 
theory of law. He states that: 
This theory . . . entails a simultaneous rejection of both an instrumen-
talist or reductionist approach, which denies that the legal order pos-
sesses any autonomy from the demand imposed on it by actors of the 
capitalist society in which it is embedded, and a formali~t approach, 
which asserts an absolute . . . autonomy of the legal order from this 
society.233 
Balbus goes on to argue that formalist analysis and reductionist, in-
strumentalist analysis are equally unsatisfactory. Formalism's focus 
on the specifics of the forms of American law produces elegant de-
scriptions of a closed, wholly autonomous legal system but avoids 
the knotty problem of conceptualizing and locating the relationships 
between those forms and the "capitalist whole of which [such forms 
are] a part."234 Both "pluralist ... [and] crude-Marxist"235 instru-
mental approaches misconstrue the law "as a mere instrument or 
tool of the will of dominant social actors."236 Consequently, such 
instrumental approaches neither explain why the forms of law in a 
particular society are as they are, nor ascertain, with respect to a 
capitalist economy, how those forms link to "the overall require-
ments of the . . . system."231 
Now that is something that any halfway critical liberal or con-
servative could have said.238 It explains, incidentally, why I earlier 
233. Balbus, supra note 232, at 571 (emphasis in original). Note the implicit separation of 
"actors" from the status of mere unthinking ''robots" of the economy's dictates. 
234. Id. at 572. 
235. Id. at 571. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. q: Gordon, Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); In-
troduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 
10 LAW & SocY. REv. 9, 10-11 (1975) (comparing American legal history concerned with the 
"inside the black box" of the law's forms with American legal history concerned with the 
"external relations" of the law). 
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said that Teachout's lumping of persons such as Tushnet and Hor-
witz into a "neo-orthodox" school won't do,239 and why "not-so-
crude" Marxists like Tushnet have attacked both Horwitz's and 
Friedman's "rapicalism."240 An interesting footnote in Balbus's ar-
gument is worth pausing on for its equation of pluralist and "crude-
Marxist" legal analysis. 
Despite their obvious opposition, there is no theoretical difference be-
tween a Pluralist and an Instrumentalist-Marxist approach to law. 
Both bypass entirely the problem of the form or structure of the legal 
order in order to conceive it as a direct reflection of consciously articu-
lated and organized pressures. Thus the difference between them is 
merely empirical: Pluralists deny that there is a systematic bias to the 
interplay of pressures; Instrumentalist Marxists argue that this inter-
play is dominated by specifically capitalist interests.241 
Very similar judgments as to the insufficiency of crude instru-
mentalist Marxism are prominent in the writings of other Marxists. 
Closely related are two other characteristics of such writing. One 
characteristic is the rejection of an approach that tries to bring order 
into all of Marx's and Engel's various legal writings, followed either 
by an attempt to make sense of the literal and implied meanings of 
certain restricted "chunks" of text242 or by giving up the exegetical 
task entirely as not worthwhile. The latter, as we have already 
noted, is Tushnet's mode.243 
The other characteristic is an attempt to construct something like 
239. See text accompanying notes 203-09 supra. 
240. See Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 228, at 106; Tushnet, Perspec-
tives on the .Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's '!4 History of Amer-
ican Law", 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81; see also Tushnet, The .Dialectics of Legal History, 51 TEX. L. 
REv. 1295 (1975) (critical ofTeachout's "hero" - G. Edward White). But see Holt, supra note 
230 (Marxist defense of Morton Horwitz). 
241. Balbus, supra note 232, at 571 n.l; cf. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1232 (1981) (seeing law as grounded in its social setting "can 
lead to explanatory models as divergent as conspiratorial Marxist instrumentalism and liberal 
pluralist instumentalism. That approach seems to underestimate the importance of law and 
legal ideology, to reduce it to a reflexive fact of social life, to demean the human activity 
associated with legal consciousness • . . ."). The latter clause, incidentally, may explain par-
tially the unpopularity among lawyers of behavioral political science's legal analysis. 
242. As, for example, Gary Young's exegesis of "only Marx's mature writings." Young, 
Marx on Bourgeois Law, in 2 REsEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 133, 134 (1979). 
243. See Tushnet, BRITISH REVIEW, supra note 228, at 123. In discussing M. CAIN & A. 
HUNT, MARx AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979), Tushnet notes: 
[The authors] have expended enormous effort in discovering and collecting the fugitive 
writings of Marx and Engels that deal with law. . . . 
This method of presentation . . . establishes that exegesis cannot give us a Marxist 
theory of law. The texts wil! support any position from reductionism to something just 
short of liberalism. Nor is it the case that we can distinguish between an early Hegelian 
Marx and a mature post-coupure Marx, or between Marx as analyst of general structures 
and Marx as analyst of particular conjunctures. The various inconsistent approaches sim-
ply coexist. 
Tushnet, BRITISH REVIEW, supra note 228, at 123; see also Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, 
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a "legitimizing pedigree" for contemporary noninstrumentalist 
Marxist analysis by reexaminioe the work, not of Marx and Engels 
themselves, but rather of, typically, early twentieth century Marxists 
- especially the Austrians Karl Renner and Rudolf Hilferding and 
the Russian E.B. Pashukanis.244 Pashukanis's rejection of both for-
malism and "the vulgar materialism which was becoming dominant 
in the USSR in his day''245 differs, it is said, from Renner's neo-
Kantian conception of the scientific method and concurrence with 
Hans Kelsen's formalist view of law as an autonomous sphere. Yet 
both views legitimize "non-vulgar'' late twentieth century Marxist 
analyses of law. 
However, such legitimation of current nonfundamentalist ap-
proaches as genuinely Marxist does not lead to quick concurrence as 
to "Shto Sdyelat?"246 The uncertainty is evident not only among 
scholars seeking to apply Marxist analysis to American law but even 
within the work of the scholar with whom we are here most con-
cerned. Furthermore, the shift in Tushnet's views developed over a 
very short span of time. Consider the variation between late-1970s 
and early-1980s ''Tushnetian Marxist" legal analysis. 
Tushnet's 1978 essay, A Marxist Analysis of American Law,241 
lays out quite clearly a not unambitious program as to what an ade-
quate Marxist theory of American law would entail. Basically, such 
a theory would have to undertake three tasks. First, it "must show 
the material basis for both the existence of a legal form in capitalist 
society and for the specific ideological content of that form . . . ."248 
In other words, without falling into "the reductionist trap of viewing 
the form and content of the law as direct expressions of the interests, 
narrowly defined, of the bourgeoisie,"249 it must explain: (a) why 
there is a rule of law in capitalist polities at all; and, (b) why the legal 
rules in such polities prioritize certain values but not others. For 
example, it should be able to explain why nineteenth century Ameri-
can law enforced harsh contracts rationally entered into rather than, 
as at an earlier phase, adjusting the contracts' terms to reach more 
supra note 228, at 2 ("I will avoid exegetical exercises • • • partly because the texts make 
exegesis futile • • • ."). 
244. See P. lIIRsT, ON LAW AND IDEOLOGY 106-22, 122-26 (1979) (discussing Pashukanis 
and Renner). 
245. Id. at 107. 
246. This is a transliteration of the title of Lenin's famous essay - in English, What is To 
Be Done? See V. LENIN, What is to Be Done, in COLLECTED WORKS 347 (V. Jerome ed. 1961). 
247. Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 228. 
248. Id. at 96. 
249. Id. 
336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:274 
equitable results,250 and why twentieth century American constitu-
tional law arguably carries equality of access to travel and entertain-
ment accommodations well beyond the Framers' original intent, but 
makes no such advances with respect to equality in school resources 
or in effective rights to settle in choice neighborhoods.251 
Moreover, the explanation of why the law thus favors formal 
rights and liberty over substantive concern for lessening disparities 
in "real" capacity to exercise such rights cannot be adequate for the 
Marxist, if it is limited to exercises in "mere" liberal intellectual his-
tory, "mere" pluralist political science, or to "mere" philosophic 
analysis of the content of talismanic review-triggering clauses such 
as "equal protection of the laws." Accordingly, the preference for 
"negative liberty''252 over "positive equality'' could not be ade-
quately "explained" in terms, for example, of the Framers' concepts 
of a nonarbitrary form of government or in terms of successive gen-
erations' evolving conceptions253 of liberty, contractual fairness, and 
the like. It is equally insufficient, from the Marxist vantage point, 
either to "explain" judicial rejection of constitutional arguments that 
would equalize school resources or reduce exclusionary zoning of 
suburbs by referring only to pluralist accounts of the liberal or con-
servative mind-sets of the judges, or to "explain away" the substance 
of constitutional "trigger-clauses" by arguing that they are formally 
empty.254 Rather, an adequate Marxist explanation would need to 
relate these judicial doctrines and the ideas and politics underlying 
them to structural economic facts of American life. 
250. If, in fact, the earlier era was properly so characterized. For argument that Horwitz 
and others err on this, see Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: 
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE LJ. 1717 (1981); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the 
Ethics of Strict Liability, IS GA. L. REv. 963 (1981). For a defense of Horwitz, see Holt, supra 
note 230, at 667-70. 
25 I. See the conflicting majority and minority opinions in San Antonio lndep. School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1972). 
252. See I. BERLIN, Two CoNCEPI'S OF LIBERTY (1958). I have changed "positive liberty" 
to "positive equality" deliberately. 
253. For a useful, but problematic, distinction between "concepts" (generalized ideas 
about X and Y - e.g. , free speech and right to counsel - that were "put once and for all" in 
the Constitution by the various Framers and that remain constant) and "conceptions" (more 
specific ideas of same that may evolve from generation to generation), see R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RJGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978). ' 
254. It is also insufficient to explain that the use of terms like "liberty" or "equality" is 
intellectually or politically confusing. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 537 (1982) (elegant argument to that effect); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas''.· Reply, 91 
YALE LJ. 1153 (1982); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A 
Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983). But see Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas''.· Logical 
Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Chemerinsky, In .Defense of 
Equality: A Reply lo Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983); D'Amato,Is Equality A 
Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600 (1983). 
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Tushnet's second necessary task for a Marxist theory of Ameri-
can law is to "show how the structure of the legal system supports its 
autonomy from the political and economic structures of capital-
ism,"255 without regarding that autonomy as absolute. His third nec-
essary task is closely related, giving "content to the idea of the 
relative autonomy of the law."256 
In other words, a Marxist theory needs to explain: (a) what it 
means to say that the legal system appears to function, in at least 
some aspects, independently of "economic and political dictates" but 
less so in other aspects; (b) which are the more, and which the less, 
apparently independent aspects both of structure and of process; ( c) 
why some aspects push toward functional independence yet others 
do not; and ( d) how and why factors external to the law brake or 
limit that independence, by making the law's autonomy only "rela-
tive," or better (since the word "relative" in non-Marxist language 
seems to demand a ''with respect to what" clause about which Marx-
ist analysis remains vague), "incomplete" or "partial."257 
Following a comment concerning the "pernicious reductionism" 
of Lawrence-Friedman-style legal history,258 Tushnet states quite 
optimistically that recent Marxist discussions have both "shifted at-
tention to the significance of the legal form itself and provided a 
solid foundation for a return to . . . analysis of the specific content 
of the law."259 This view envisages Marxist theory as potentially ca-
pable of explaining not merely the form of capitalist law - for ex-
ample, why state-provided welfare "to the dominated classes . . . 
proceed[s] according to general rules applied by lower-level officials 
not thought to have substantial discretion."260 It also conceives of 
Marxist theory as capable of explaining the content of that law - for 
example, why "regulation of collective workers' activity [became] 
collective bargaining in an essentially contractual framework."261 
After discussing three possible responses to the Neo-Realist con-
tention that large sectors of the law ''which might seem to express the 
255. Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 228, at 96. 
256. Id. 
257. "Partial," of course, has its ambiguities too. 
258. The non-Marxist reader should be alerted that the phrase ''pernicious reductionism" 
is used in Marxist prose less to distinguish it from ''non-pernicious" or "deft" reductionism 
(for example, reducing llllll/555555ths to I/5th) than to differentiate the merely ''perni-
cious" (no evidence of mens rea) from the "heinous" (evidence of mens rea) form of 
reductionism. 
259. Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 228, at 96. 
260. Id. at 97. 
261. Id. 
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fundamental presuppositions of capitalist society [are in fact] essen-
tially irrelevant to the transactions of capitalists"262 - an attack 
which, if successful, might undermine any Marxist theory of law -
Tushnet goes on to argue that an adequate Marxist theory needs to 
focus on three issues: (1) how ideologies are generated; (2) whether 
capitalist material conditions give rise to distinctively capitalist legal 
forms of ideology; and (3) what the consequences are of "the contra-
dictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production."263 The essay 
concludes with brief discussions of, in Tushnet's view, significant but 
flawed examinations of these issues.264 The details of Tushnet's 
characterizations of these examinations need not detain us here; the 
important point involves the scope of the Marxist analytic enterprise 
contemplated. Tushnet seeks a general theory of American law that 
explains both the form and content of that law as well as how each 
rests upon a "material basis" that pins down the extent of autonomy 
in the law, and that, having determined the genesis and operation of 
capitalist ideology, works out the consequences. 
Now let us contrast that fairly tall order with Tushnet's more re-
cent formulations, half a decade later. A fair characterization of 
Tushnet's more recent position(s) - as laid out particularly in Is 
There A Marxist Theory of Law?, Marxism as Metaphor, and Marx-
ism and Law265 - is that it recedes substantially from his 1978 posi-
tion on at least the following scores: (1) the feasibility of a general 
Marxist theory of American law which explains adequately and sys-
tematically both the law's content(s) and its form(s); and (2) in tum, 
the likely potential scope of Marxist explanation and the satisfactory 
minimum content of a Marxist theory of law. 
At times, indeed, he turns almost puckishly cynical, as when he 
says: "It may be . . . that to the degree that a theory is distinctively 
Marxist, it is not a good theory, and conversely."266 Tushnet's non-
262. Id. Tushnet is particularly concerned with Stewart Macaulay's studies. See Macau-
lay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); 
see also Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717 
(1982) (challenging the view that common law doctrines may determine significantly the allo-
cation of resources in society). 
263. Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT l'ERsPECTIVES, supra note 228, at 101. 
264. See Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method far 
Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1977) (perceived by Tushnet as demonstrating 
the potential for using phenomenological approaches in tandem with Marxist analysis); Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (per-
ceived by Tushnet as fruitful but incomplete analysis of internal contradictions in legal 
thought); Unger, supra note 184 (same). 
265. See Tushnet, 198 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228; Tushnet, 1983 Marxism and 
Law, supra note 228; Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, supra note 228. 
266. Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, supra note 228, at 15. 
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Marxist reader could, I think, be pardoned for drawing from this sort 
of statement the conclusion that the pursuit of a Marxist theory of 
American law is hardly worth the candle. But the conclusion would 
be premature. A more cautious, middle-of-the-journey assessment 
would come in two parts. The :first consists in determining the main 
features of what Tushnet describes in his less throw-in-the-towel mo-
ments as a weak or minimum-satisfactory Marxist approach, and to 
try to account for this particular more-moderate recession from the 
"1978 high." The second (which we shall defer) is to see to what 
extent, if at all, it is Marxist theory ("strong" or ''weak") that lies at 
the base of Tushnet's critiques of "main-line" positions in the cur-
rent debates over constitutional issues, in the scholarship oflegal his-
tory, and more generally in conventional law school research. 
Let us, therefore, conclude this Article by sketching, and ac-
counting for, Tushnet's more modest, but still ostensibly Marxist po-
sition on the law's analysis. I begin with the "accounting for'' 
because, if I am right, it makes the substance of Tushnet's position 
more easily understandable. 
First, let us try to explain his retreat from the 1978 idea of a 
grand theory explaining both form and content in American law. I , 
detect three prime causes. 
One lies in the extent to which he is consistently impressed by 
what he takes to be the "true truths" of early twentieth century 
American Legal Realism as well as of its more recent manifestations. 
Over and over again, in his critiques of conventional "liberal plural-
ist" and conventional "formalist" legal scholarship, he uses a "legal 
realist truth" to (he thinks) show conclusively that a particular con-
tention (from either "school") is wrong. The "truth" is that there is 
no principled order in the law because any clever267 judge can ma-
nipulate precedent to reach any result he wishes. Therefore, asserts 
Tushnet, any argument for a principled formalist order in the set of 
cases under consideration is erroneous. 
Yet, and this is the second cause, the most obvious analytic 
stance to derive from this ''truth'' - legal nihilism - appalls him 
morally more than it appeals to him intellectually. Although he 
seems at times fascinated by the "cold steel" side of, for example, 
Holmes' legal realism (with small letters), he does not share the 
Holmesian delight in perceiving the mailed fist beneath the velvet 
267. See Tushnet, 1978 MARxlsT PERsPECTIVES, supra note 228, at 99. The "relative clev-
erness" of judges is also a theme in Tushnet's legal historical writing. It relates, though he 
never quite says so, to "relative autonomy." 
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glove,268 or for that matter, Posner's delight in taking from X to give 
to Y for reasons of economic efficiency. It may be sensible judicial 
behavior for judges to recognize, as Holmes would have had them 
do,269 imminent shifts in the balance of power among more and less 
fortunate societal groupings, and "a-morally" rubber-stamp such 
shifts rather than blocking the redistributive way. But, for Tushnet, 
that is not enough. For, even if judges do not block the shift for 
long, 270 people suffer in the meantime. Moreover, nothing in legal 
nihilism explains why some politicians, including judges, block the 
shift while others stand aside and still others abet the shift. Nor do 
the intellectual puerilities of political science's "behavioralism deriv-
ative" explanations of judicial behavior begin genuinely to explain 
why judges behave as they do,271 why they participate in the judi-
cially wrought wrongs this day, or any other day, done let alone 
atone for them.272 Hence, Tushnet is driven to search out an explan-
atory model of law and humanity, and inhumanity, that might ex-
plain, even as it might partially exculpate, that which contemporary 
judges, legal scholars, and mere persons do and do not do in hurting 
each other. Having described as his most important concern the 
hurts inflicted on mere persons in this vale of post-industrial exist-
ence, Tushnet goes straight, not to a single, but to one primary, and 
two secondary goals. The primary recourse is to a, if not the, major 
268. See Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial 
Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975 (1977). 
269. See id. at 1030. 
270. As did, according to the conventional liberal pluralist view of the matter, the Supreme 
Court majority from the Lochner era until 1937. For a more benign view of the Court during 
much of that time, see J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RE-
SPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920 (1978). 
271. Tushnet is generally among the more sympathetic of law school scholars toward polit-
ical-science-in-law. But he can be severe about certain aspects of its behavioral branch. Thus: 
The next move was to look for the origins of . . . policy preferences in the social origins 
and political experiences of the judges. [Citing G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE 
ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, !946-1963 (1965).] 
There is of course something to this kind of argument, but it suffers from an unbear-
able simple-mindedness. Many law professors ..• have spent one or two years as a law 
clerk to a judge. They know from experience that the vote-counters do not describe what 
really happens when a judge makes a decision and, with the assistance of people like 
themselves, writes an opinion. Further, the reductionist account may have had a core of 
truth in it, but it eliminated much of the richness of the system of legal rules and institu-
tions. Even if it was all a silly game, that game was elaborately choreographed in ways 
that the vote-counters could not understand. 
Tushnet, Post-Rea/isl Legal Scholarship, !980 W1s. L. REV. 1383, 1397 (1980). He concludes 
with beautiful aptness: "It is as if a scene in a ballet were described by saying that the male 
character moved from left to right while the female character moved upstage. It is true 
enough-but somehow lacking in flavor." Id. 
272. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "The thin 
disguise of'equal' acco=odations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, 
nor atone for the wrong this day done." 
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mode ofpost-1800 Western analysis that purports to explain the ma-
terial sources of the human condition in industrial society - to 
Marxism.273 
The two secondary goals flow from this primary recourse. One 
secondary goal, really an embrace, is phenomenology. It is pursued, 
I surmise, on the assumption that it may explain part of.the gap left 
by "crude Marxism" - namely, why the normal run of persons, and 
judges, (mis)perceive as they do. The other secondary goal, also in-
volving an embrace out of faith, is semiology. Thus: 
The most promising line of investigation . . . is . . . opened up by . . . 
the unholy trinity of semiology, phenomenology, and Marxism .... 
[W]hy do people think the way they do? The essential contribution of 
semiology has been to show how complex ways of thinking are-how 
ways of thinking indeed make totalistic claims on all who share them. 
The essential contribution of phenomenology has been to show how 
forms of life work themselves into complex ways of thinking. And the 
essential contribution of Marxism has been to show that the funda-
mental forms of life are those implicated in material social relations of 
production-and that those relations, because they contain contradic-
tions, allow contradictory ways of thinking to develop.274 
Thus, Tushnet opts for "Marxism-plus." 
To say this is to point to the instability of Tushnet's 1978 grand 
theory solution, and to the third cause of his recession from predict-
ing the success of grand theory. The combination of "Marxism-plus-
semiology-plus-phenomenology'' leads toward scrutiny of the 
"meaning-content" of Marxist language, in part because of analytic 
queries about language common to both semiology and phenome-
nology and in part because both have developed at least in "Conti-
nental" part against the "Viennese-Anglo-American" backdrop of 
linguistic positivism and its progeny. Therein, arguably, at least 
from the perspective of its Anglo-American reception, has lain 
Marxism's Achilles' heel. It has been, in its pre-revisionist forms at 
least, notoriously un-self-analytic as to how its language, in sum-
ming human experience, reconstructs, elides, and foreshortens that 
experience. That lack of self-critical awareness b,as made it easy -
for better or worse - for the Anglo-American empiricist mode of 
273. Let me emphasize that I mean Marxism, not Leninism or Maoism. The recourse is 
tempting for any thinking and feeling academic who is neither endowed at a deep level with 
the whimsical pessimism about human destiny that makes for cavalier conservatism, nor pos-
sessed of the possessions that make for self-interested conservatism, nor imbued with the ca-
pacity to truncate intellectual from psychic terms of existence that lead to adopting 
conventional law or social science pluralist research norms while "voting for (a little) change" 
as persons, nor yet endowed with the sheer unoriginality, the moral indifference, of most essen-
tially derivative academic intellects. 
274. Tushnet, supra note 271, at 1399. 
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thinking to reject Marxism as verbally careless, hence not to be taken 
seriously. 
This, very likely, accounts for the first of four main characteris-
tics that differentiate Tushnet's ''weaker Marxist approach" from his 
1978 grand version. Those four characteristics are (1) a sense that 
Marxist language is often awkwardly metaphorical; (2) a concomi-
tant uncertainty about whether such language can adequately cope 
with four recurrent criticisms of Marxist theory in general; (3) doubt 
not only as to the capacity of a Marxist explanation oflaw to explain 
its "content" but also about its capacity to explain much of the law's 
form; and ( 4) substantial inspecificity concerning that which remains 
distinctively Marxist about what is left in the approach. 
With respect to the first characteristic - the metaphoric deficien-
cies of Marxist explanatory language - the "current Tushnet" al-
most gives up on any concerted defense, saying, for example: "A 
Marxist analysis of law claims that there is a reasonably systematic 
relation between the law and the relations of production, with the 
latter more or less sort of determining the former. (The fuzziness is 
... inevitable.)"275 Elsewhere, he contrasts reductionism and liber-
alism, which appear to have adequate metaphors as to what law is 
and how it functions, with Marxism, which does "not have the meta-
phors at hand for 'relative autonomy.' "276 
As to the second characteristic, Tushnet recognizes four recurrent 
criticisms of Marxism: (a) a problem of mechanism, which most 
non-Marxists attack;277 (b) the problem oflaw as constitutive, which 
"arises pretty much within the Marxist camp";278 (c) the problem of 
reification, which he argues is ''the peculiar American contribution 
to the discussion";279 and ( d) the problem of the extent to which 
275. Tushnet, 1983 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228, at 1 (emphasis added)., 
276. Tushnet, BRITISH REvrew, supra note 228, at 123. 
277. The problem is to explain the mechanism by which capitalist law subserves ruling 
class interests - given judges' formal independence from class pressures as well as the scanti-
ness of evidence indicating that judges believe that they are not independent or that they act as 
"instruments of the ruling class." Tushnet, 1933 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228, at 1. 
278. Id. The problem of law as constitutive is: 
[i]n its simplest version ... : class relations are defined in terms of whether or not mem-
bers of a class own the means of production. Yet ownership is a legal category which 
takes on its meaning only because of its relation to all the other available legal categories. 
Law thus seems to define or constitute class relations, in which case it is circular to say 
that the relations of production sort of determine the law. How then is a Marxist analysIS 
of law possible? 
Id. at 1-2. 
219. Id. at 2. One could argue with Totlfnet's view that there is something particularly 
distinctive about American legal realism cs a source of objections that Marxist language is 
unduly prone to reification. But here is his statement of the problem: 
Most Marxists seem to want to say that a rule of l~w - the fellow servant rule is a classic 
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Marxist analysis is "scientific" or "normative."280 Tushnet's discus-
sion of these problems is disarmingly frank. But some of his conclu-
sions - for example, that the most satisfactory answers to the 
problems of mechanism and of law as constitutive ''weaken the 
claim that Marxists have a special way of analyzing the law"281 -
run the risk of disarming the analysis entirely. So too, his declara-
tions "that one cannot readily distinguish within the Marxist tradi-
tion between Marxism as a sociological/historical theory and 
Marxism as a normative critique of capitalism,"282 and that "it is 
more fruitful"283 to assume that a Marxist theory must be sociologi-
cal with "the normative critique . . . immanent in the theory,"284 do 
not really get us very far. 
With respect to the third characteristic, Tushnet, after deciding 
that Marxism is not likely to explain effectively the content of capi-
talist law, even waffles as to Marxism's ability to explain that law's 
form. Having agreed with Hugh Collins that the only explanatory 
candidate is "one that deals with the form and not the content of the 
law," and that the "commodity exchange theory is the leading, per-
haps the only, contender of that [form-only-explaining] sort,"285 
Tushnet goes on to argue that a "Marxist theory of the legal form 
may be impossible."2s6 
What, then, are we left with if not substantial uncertainty as to 
what is distinctively Marxist? We have a concern for setting about 
the hard work of developing a position between liberalism and re-
ductionism,287 a concern for explaining the law's "relative auton-
omy," and a set of unsolved analytic problems about the law's 
relationship to the economic infrastructure. We have also an inher-
example-serves class interests. Yet the legal realists taught us that there never was a 
"fellow servant rule" that could be a di!pendent variable to be explained in terms of its 
links to the economic base. There were and always are rules and counterrules, rules with 
exceptions of such scope as to threaten the rule itself, rules whose force can be eliminated 
by creatively drawing on analogies to apparently unrelated areas of law, and so on. Stat-
utes too have to be interpreted . . . and cannot be unc.;rstood as . . . words whose mean-
ing is fixed at the time of enactment What then can Marxist analysis try to analyze? 
Id. at 2. I am not convinced that all these problems are exactly mind-stumpers. 
280. Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, supra note 228, at 3. 
281. Tushnet, 1983 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228, at 2 (discussing Hugh Collins' 
answer to these problems in H. COLLINS, MARxlsM AND LAW (1982)). 
282. Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, mpra note 228, at 3. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Tushnet, 1983 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228, at 15 (discussing H. COLLINS, 
supra note 281). 
286. Tushnet, 1983 Marxism as Metaphor, supra note 228, at 15. 
287. See Tushnet, BR1TISH REVIEW, supra note 228, at 122. 
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ent normative critique of capitalism and of legal scholars who do 
their scholarship, whether as liberals or as conservatives, without re-
gard to the norms embraced in that critique. What does that amount 
to? Tushnet concedes the resultant analytic anemia, though he de-
clares that he is "comfortable with such an anemic reconstruction of 
a Marxist theory of law''288 - even if the reconstruction looks more 
like destruction and even if the end point seems very "close to liberal 
sociology."289 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
If that were all that could be said about Tushnet's Marxist theory 
of American law, non-Marxists might reasonably close the book on 
it without more. Nor would Tushnet's three reasons for referring to 
his position as Marxist, given just after the above-quoted declaration 
of satisfaction with analytic anemia, convince us otherwise: (1) that 
"the effort to produce a sociological theory that is both good and 
distinctively Marxist may be thought to have failed, but negative re-
sults . . . are nonetheless important";290 (2) that "calling the theory 
Marxist is a statement of affiliation with an international tradition of 
struggle for liberation [including] the upheavals in Poland";291 and 
(3) that it is important to "emphasiz[e] ... political distance from 
liberalism."292 This runs the danger of seeming closer to moral pos-
turing than to something worth e:x:amininB at length. 
There are, however, the other "two faces" of Tushnet - those 
that appear when he turns from attempts to develop systematic the-
ory to legal history and to critiques of contemporary constitutional 
scholarship. These represent, after all, the bulk of his analytic con-
tributions to legal scholarship. Their examination may be 
worthwhile. 
To anticipate the sequel to this Article, it may be argued that 
such examination is fruitful for three reasons. First, analysis of those 
contributions reveals that many of their strengths and weaknesses 
come from a curiously disjointed shoving together of "strong" Neo-
Legal-Realist and ''weak" Marxist approaches. Second and more 
specifically, this shoving together produces not analytic chaos or ane-
mia in applied analysis, but rather a recurrent and unintentionally 
patterned series of insights and blindnesses about the state of con-
288. Tushnet, 1981 Marxist Theory, supra note 228, at 29. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 30. 
292. Id. 
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temporary legal scholarship and late twentieth century American 
law. Third, construed together with other -recent radical analyses -
for example, those of Karl Klare and Roberto Unger - the upshot 
is a correct diagnosis of severe strain in the law's capacity to deal 
with American social and economic problems but an incorrect diag-
nosis as to the primary culprit - liberalism. American problems, I 
would argue, are more complex than that. So too, both their solu-
tions and the roles of laws, judges, and legal scholars in venturing 
toward such solutions are more complicated than the problem-solv-
ing analytic recourse explicit in much "radical analysis" of American 
law - abjuring liberal law and liberal legalism in favor of Karl 
Marx. 
